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ABSTRACT 
  Legislative intent is a fiction. Courts and scholars accept this, by and 
large. As this Article shows, however, both are confused as to why 
legislative intent is a fiction and as to what this fiction entails.  
  This Article first argues that the standard explanation—that 
Congress is a “they,” not an “it”—rests on an unduly simple conception 
of shared agency. Drawing from contemporary scholarship in the 
philosophy of action, it contends that Congress has no collective 
intention, not because of difficulties in aggregating the intentions of 
individual members, but rather because Congress lacks the sort of 
delegatory structure that one finds in, for example, a corporation. 
  Second, this Article argues that—contrary to a recent, influential 
wave of scholarship—the fictional nature of legislative intent leaves 
interpreters of legislation with little reason to care about the fine details 
of legislative process. It is a platitude that legislative text must be 
interpreted in “context.” Context, however, consists of information 
salient to author and audience alike. This basic insight from the 
philosophy of language necessitates what this Article calls the 
“conversation” model of interpretation. Legislation is written by 
legislators for those tasked with administering the law—for example, 
courts and agencies—and those on whom the law operates—for 
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example, citizens. Almost any interpreter thus occupies the position of 
conversational participant, reading legislative text in a context 
consisting of information salient both to members of Congress and to 
citizens (as well as agencies, courts, etc.). 
  The conversation model displaces what this Article calls the 
“eavesdropping” model of interpretation—the prevailing paradigm 
among both courts and scholars. When asking what sources of 
information an interpreter should consider, courts and scholars have 
reliably privileged the epistemic position of members of Congress. The 
result is that legislation is erroneously treated as having been written by 
legislators exclusively for other legislators. This tendency is plainest in 
recent scholarship urging greater attention to legislative process—the 
nuances of which are of high salience to legislators but plainly not to 
citizens.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Claims about legislative intent are pervasive and, contrary to 
popular scholarly opinion, unavoidable.1 The reason is that statutory 
interpretation, like ordinary conversation, is rife with what linguists 
and philosophers call pragmatic inference—inference based upon the 
surrounding practical circumstance.  
In both everyday contexts and the law, attribution of practical 
intentions is indispensable to understanding what people mean. The 
War Powers Resolution (WPR), for example, states that the President 
shall “terminate any use of United States Armed Forces” for hostilities 
or another specified action within sixty days “unless,” among other 
things, “the Congress . . . has declared war.”2 Setting aside 
constitutional concerns,3 all agree that the WPR requires the President 
to terminate the use of the Armed Forces within sixty days unless 
Congress has declared war since the initial use of the Armed Forces for 
the hostilities or other specified action. That Congress has declared war 
at some point in the past is, by contrast, irrelevant.4 Interpreters rightly 
treat this as obvious. But how do they know? As this Article explains, 
interpreters know what Congress is trying to say only because they 
understand what Congress is trying to do; here, trying to limit the 
President’s authority to use the Armed Forces without congressional 
approval. 
Although necessary for the reasons above, attributions of 
legislative intent to Congress are also literally false. This is because, as 
an empirical matter, members of Congress do not share intentions.5 
 
 1. See, e.g., Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative 
History by the Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70, 76 (2012) (“[N]o one need look for the fictional intent of 
Congress in searching for the meaning of its decisions.”); see also id. (“‘[L]egislative intent’ is 
obscuring, even for those of us who consider ourselves ‘originalists’ in matters of statutory 
interpretation. Intent is simply a constitutional heuristic used to remind judges . . . it is 
[Congress’s] decision.”); Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David 
Schoenbrod, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 777 n.7 (1999) (“The notions of congressional 
understanding and legislative intent are merely metaphors, of course, and somewhat misleading 
anthropomorphizing metaphors at that . . . .”). 
 2. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (2012). 
 3. See Stephen L. Carter, The Constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution, 70 VA. L. 
REV. 101, 108–12 (1984) (surveying the prevailing arguments for and against the War Powers 
Resolution). 
 4. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 116, 77th Cong., 55 Stat. 795 (1941) (declaring war on Japan in the 
wake of Pearl Harbor). 
 5. See generally MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, SHARED AGENCY: A PLANNING THEORY OF 
ACTING TOGETHER (2014) (articulating a theory of shared agency); MARGARET GILBERT, JOINT 
COMMITMENT: HOW WE MAKE THE SOCIAL WORLD (2013) (same); John R. Searle, Collective 
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That Congress is a “they,” not an “it,” is a common refrain.6 But as this 
Article explains, familiar public-choice-theory arguments against 
legislative intent of the sort voiced by Professor Kenneth Shepsle rest 
on a doubtful premise, namely that the sharing of intentions is about 
the aggregation of attitudes. As this Article shows, the ability to 
aggregate lots of individual intentions is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for the formation of shared intentions. One can, for example, 
attribute to a corporation its general counsel’s intention to settle a 
lawsuit, even if other members of the corporation are unaware of the 
suit.  
As this Article argues, however, the in-vogue analogy between 
corporations and Congress also fails.7 To use the previous example, one 
can make sense of an attribution of an intention to settle only because 
members of a corporation share an intention to delegate to the 
corporation’s general counsel control over legal strategy. Members of 
Congress, by contrast, share no corresponding intention to treat as 
authoritative the views of a statute’s “principal sponsors” or “others 
who worked to secure enactment.”8 Add to this the lack of a 
mechanism for reconciling the intentions of committee drafters with 
the intentions of drafters of later amendments, and it becomes clear 
that, even on a more sophisticated understanding of shared agency, 
Congress has few if any intentions qua “it.” 
To resolve the above tension—that Congress must have intentions 
for legislation to be meaningful but reliably fails to form them—this 
Article argues that one should accept what philosophers call 
“fictionalism” about legislative intent.9 Fictionalism is the thesis that 
claims made within some area of discourse are best understood as 
involving a useful fiction instead of aiming for literal truth. When 
children play cops and robbers, for example, utterances such as “Mary 
 
Intentions and Actions, in INTENTIONS IN COMMUNICATION 401 (Philip R. Cohen, Jerry Morgan 
& Martha E. Pollack eds., 1990) (same). 
 6. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as 
Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992). 
 7. See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION: ON THE THEORY 
OF LAW AND PRACTICAL REASON 280 (2009) (arguing that because “[w]e find no problem 
attributing intentions to corporations, groups, and institutions in ordinary life,” lawmaking 
institutions can have intentions); Nourse, supra note 1, at 82 (“Just as corporations are bound by 
the statements of their agents, Congress may be bound by the statements of its agents.”). 
 8. ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 48 (2014). 
 9. See generally Matti Eklund, Fictionalism, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 
(2015), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/fictionalism [https://perma.cc/WA9K-
DVH6] (providing an overview of fictionalism). 
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has a gun!” or “The money is in the vault!” involve an obvious 
pretense. As this Article explains, utterances within a fictionalist 
discourse are still true or false—or, perhaps better, apt or inapt. It is 
just that truth is determined by pretense combined with facts on the 
ground. Whether Mary “has a gun,” for instance, could hinge on 
whether Mary possesses a twig. 
This Article defends fictionalism about legislative intent in regards 
to the U.S. Congress. As this Article explains, intent claims about 
Congress are false if taken literally because federal statutes have no 
unitary author. For that reason, the Article argues that interpreters of 
statutes should accept the pretense that statutes have some singular 
author. Relative to this pretense, a claim about legislative intent is apt 
if and only if one would make the claim about a generic author just on 
the basis of her having written the statute as enacted. So conceived, 
fictionalism about legislative intent amounts to a philosophical 
refinement of what textualists sometimes refer to as “objectified” 
legislative intent, characterized as “the import that a reasonable person 
conversant with applicable social and linguistic conventions would 
attach to the enacted words.”10 
To say that intent is a fiction is not to say that one can attribute 
any desired “intention” to a piece of legislation. It is a platitude that a 
legislative text must be interpreted “in context.”11 As this Article 
emphasizes, however, context consists of information salient to both 
author and audience.12 As philosopher Robert Stalnaker observes, 
“participants in [a] conversation” depend upon cognitive “common 
 
 10. John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 424 (2005); see 
also Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States 
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 17 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (explaining that textualists 
appeal to “a sort of ‘objectified’ intent—the intent that a reasonable person would gather from 
the text of the law, placed alongside the remainder of the corpus juris”). 
 11. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 536 (1983) (“The 
philosophy of language, and most particularly the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, has established 
that sets of words do not possess intrinsic meanings and cannot be given them . . . .”); John F. 
Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2392 (2003) (“[I]t is now well settled 
that textual interpretation must account for the text in its social and linguistic context.”). 
 12. See, e.g., Kent Bach, Content ex Machina, in SEMANTICS VERSUS PRAGMATICS 15, 19 
(Zoltán Gendler Szabó ed., 2005) [hereinafter Bach, Content ex Machina] (“Communicative 
success requires uttering a sentence which, given the mutually salient information that comprises 
the extralinguistic cognitive context of utterance, makes the speaker’s communicative intention 
evident and enables his audience to recognize it.” (emphasis added)). 
DOERFLER IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/10/2017  9:27 AM 
984  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:979 
ground” to make their communicative intentions known.13 When one 
person says to another, “I will see you at the beach,” that attempt at 
communication succeeds only if there is some beach salient to both.  
That context consists of common ground has significant 
implications for statutory interpretation. It necessitates what this 
Article calls the “conversation” model of interpretation. In this model, 
legislation is assumed to be written by Congress both for those tasked 
with administering the law and for those on whom the law operates. 
An interpreter occupies the position of conversational participant, 
hearing statements directed at her and other participants. So situated, 
an interpreter reads legislative text in a “context” consisting of 
information salient both to members of Congress and to citizens (as 
well as agencies, courts, etc.).  
As this Article explains, adherence to the conversation model 
does not itself dictate what sources of information an interpreter 
should consider when interpreting a statute. What it does is alter the 
range of plausible answers to that question. If, in addition to text, one 
thinks that courts should consider legislative history, one is hard-
pressed to explain why they should not also consider public statements 
by officials or popular-media reports. Such visible portrayals of 
legislation are of much higher salience to most Americans than a report 
by the U.S. House of Representatives. 
The conversation model displaces what this Article calls the 
“eavesdropping” model of interpretation, the prevailing paradigm 
among both courts and scholars. When asking what information an 
interpreter should consider, both courts and scholars have typically 
privileged the epistemic position of members of Congress. The result 
is that legislation has erroneously been treated as having been written 
by legislators exclusively for other legislators. An interpreter is 
relegated to eavesdropper, listening in on—but not serving as a 
participant in—those legislators’ conversations. So situated, an 
interpreter reads legislative text in a context consisting of information 
salient to members of Congress. 
Both textualists and purposivists adhere to the eavesdropping 
model much, if not all, of the time. The longstanding debate over 
whether to consider legislative history,14 for example, reflects an 
 
 13. Robert Stalnaker, Common Ground, 25 LINGUISTICS & PHIL. 701, 701 (2002) (emphasis 
omitted). 
 14. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the 
Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 
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impulse to eavesdrop on both sides.15 Adherence to the eavesdropping 
model is plainest, however, in recent, influential scholarship urging 
greater attention to “how Congress really works.”16 This scholarship 
asks interpreters to sort legislative history “wheat” from “chaff” by 
paying careful attention to the legislative process.17 Judge Robert 
Katzmann, for example, suggests that courts pay special attention to 
the materials that participants in the drafting process use to “become 
educated about [a] bill.”18 Likewise, Professors Abbe Gluck and Lisa 
Bressman recommend attention to different types of legislative 
history—as well as other nontextual information like Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO) scores or legislation’s “path through 
Congress”19—in proportion to the significance assigned to those 
sources by “drafters,” that is, participants in the legislative drafting 
process.20 This Article argues that none of these approaches makes 
sense when the context consists of information salient to all, not only 
 
STAN. L. REV. 901, 964 & n.212 (2013) [hereinafter Gluck & Bressman, Part I] (collecting cases 
and stating that “[t]he other primary interpretive source that courts consider—and the one whose 
use is most hotly contested—is legislative history”); Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. 
L. REV. 347, 353 (2005) (recognizing that “[t]extualists and intentionalists have a well-known 
disagreement about the proper use of internal legislative history”); Adrian Vermeule, Legislative 
History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. 
L. REV. 1833, 1833 (1998) (“Intentionalists and textualists have vigorously debated whether 
judges should consult legislative history in statutory interpretation cases.”). 
 15. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (“I am confident that only a small proportion of the Members of 
Congress read either one of the Committee Reports in question . . . .”); KATZMANN, supra note 
8, at 18 (“[B]eyond the work of their own committees, of which legislators have direct knowledge, 
members operate in a system in which they rely on the work of colleagues on other committees.”); 
id. at 19 (“Legislators and their staffs become educated about the bill by reading the materials 
produced by the committees and conference committees from which the proposed legislation 
emanates.”). 
 16. Nourse, supra note 1, at 143 (“Both textualists and purposivists have to understand how 
Congress really works.”); accord KATZMANN, supra note 8, at 8 (“[T]here has been scant 
consideration given to what I think is critical as courts discharge their interpretative task—an 
appreciation of how Congress actually functions . . . .”). 
 17. KATZMANN, supra note 8, at 54; see also Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 14, at 989 
(“[T]he real question about legislative history is not whether it should be consulted but, rather, 
how to separate the useful from the misleading.”); Nourse, supra note 1, at 72 (“Since neither 
scholars nor lawyers dispute that, as a matter of fact, legislative history is used, the question is 
how it is best used.”). 
 18. KATZMANN, supra note 8, at 19. 
 19. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An 
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 
725, 780 (2014) [hereinafter Bressman & Gluck, Part II]. 
 20. See Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 14, at 988–89. 
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to drafters. “[I]gnorance of how Congress works”21 is lamentable for 
various reasons, but the nuances of the legislative process are largely 
irrelevant for the purpose of interpretation. 
This Article has three Parts. Part I explains why claims about 
legislative intent are pervasive and unavoidable. It argues that, as with 
ordinary conversations, where recognition of a speaker’s intention is 
integral to efficient and effective communication, the same is true of 
statutory interpretation. 
Part II argues that claims about legislative intent are reliably false 
if taken literally. On any tenable account of shared agency, Congress, 
lacking a delegatory structure, is incapable of forming collective 
intentions, other than the bare intention to enact text into law. 
Although recent scholarship urging greater attention to the legislative 
process insists that shared intentions are visible to the sophisticated 
eye, this Part argues that attention to process only supports skepticism 
about intent. 
Part III urges that, to resolve the tension resulting from Parts I and 
II, interpreters should embrace fictionalism about legislative intent. 
Traditionally, the debate between textualists and purposivists has 
offered interpreters a choice between considering only formally 
adopted materials—like legislative text and prior judicial decisions—
and considering such materials plus certain information of high 
salience to government officials—like committee reports and CBO 
scores. If one accepts fictionalism, by contrast, the choice is between 
considering just formally adopted materials—salient to all in virtue of 
their formal bindingness—and considering such materials along with 
an array of nontextual sources, including public speeches and popular 
media coverage.22 
I.  CONGRESS MUST HAVE INTENTIONS 
Claims about legislative intent are pervasive and unavoidable. 
Think about an ordinary conversation. There, recognizing a speaker’s 
intention is integral to efficient and effective communication. As this 
Part explains, communication via statute is, as practiced, no different.23 
 
 21. Nourse, supra note 1, at 85; see also KATZMANN, supra note 8, at 49 (“The paucity of 
judicial knowledge about congressional rules and processes relating to the judicial process . . . is 
striking.”). 
 22. See infra notes 281–82 and accompanying text. 
 23. This Article assumes a standard Gricean account of communication according to which 
the meaning of words and sentences can be analyzed in terms of speaker intention, in particular 
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For that reason, to make sense of legislation in a way that is consistent 
with our positive law of interpretation, one must attribute intentions to 
authors of legislation with much the same frequency as one does to 
speakers in ordinary conversation. As this Part explains, attributing 
communicative intentions to Congress is part and parcel of identifying 
what Congress “means” when it speaks. More still, attributing practical 
intentions is necessary to determine both what statutes “say” and what 
they communicate indirectly—in other words, what they “imply” or 
“presuppose.”  
A. What Congress Means 
What an interlocutor cares about in ordinary conversation is a 
speaker’s communicative intention. Take a simple case: it is late 
morning and A says to B, “Would you like a bagel?” B responds, “No, 
thank you. I’ve had breakfast.” Philosophers of language disagree as to 
whether, in this context, the sentence “I’ve had breakfast” expresses 
the proposition that B has had breakfast at some point in the past or 
the proposition that B has had breakfast that morning.24 Where 
 
the intention to communicate certain information through the utterance of sentences. See 
generally PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS (1989). The Gricean framework differs 
from a semantic externalist framework, according to which the meaning of a term is determined—
in whole or in part—by factors external to the speaker. See generally SAUL A. KRIPKE, NAMING 
AND NECESSITY (1980) (putting forth a semantic externalist framework). As even its critics 
acknowledge, the Gricean framework enjoys “almost universal acceptance” within legal 
interpretation. Marcin Matczak, Does Legal Interpretation Need Paul Grice?: Reflections on 
Lepore and Stone’s Imagination and Convention 1 (Jan. 16, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with the Duke Law Journal) (defending an alternative, externalist account of statutory and 
constitutional interpretation); see also ERNIE LEPORE & MATTHEW STONE, IMAGINATION AND 
CONVENTION: DISTINGUISHING GRAMMAR AND INFERENCE IN LANGUAGE (2014) (defending 
an externalist account of communication generally). Courts in particular accept a broadly 
Gricean—or, in terms more familiar to legal scholarship, intentionalist—framework, more or less 
without exception. See, e.g., FAA v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441, 1450 n.4 (2012) (“[O]ur task is to 
determine what Congress meant by ‘actual.’”); Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 
550 U.S. 81, 93 (2007) (“Under this Court’s precedents, if the intent of Congress is clear and 
unambiguously expressed by the statutory language at issue, that would be the end of our 
analysis.”); Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 285 (1978) (“In the Act, 
Congress has given a substantial indication of the intended meaning of the term [at issue].”); 
United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 542 (1940) (“In the interpretation of statutes, 
the function of the courts is easily stated. It is to construe the language so as to give effect to the 
intent of Congress.”); see also Ryan D. Doerfler, The Scrivener’s Error, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 811, 
826 (2016) (collecting cases and arguing that “it is well established as a matter of positive law that 
the object of inquiry in statutory interpretation is Congress’s communicative intention, 
appropriately conceived”). 
 24. Compare Bach, Content ex Machina, supra note 12, at 37 (“[T]he speaker . . . didn’t say 
that he hadn’t had breakfast that day. That’s because he left this for inference (notice that this 
inference is much harder to make if [the sentence] is uttered late in the day).”), with FRANCOIS 
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everyone agrees, of course, is that B intends to communicate the latter 
proposition.25 Although the philosophical question regarding sentence 
meaning is interesting, what matters to A is that B’s communicative 
intention is clear. 
Likewise, the object of inquiry in statutory interpretation is 
communicative intent as opposed to something like sentence meaning. 
Consider the WPR, which states that the president shall “terminate  
any use of United States Armed Forces” within sixty days “unless,” 
among other things, “the Congress . . . has declared war.”26 Again, 
philosophers dispute whether, as used, this sentence expresses the 
proposition that the president shall terminate any use of the Armed 
Forces within sixty days unless Congress has declared war at some 
point in the past or the proposition that she shall do so unless Congress 
has declared war since the initial use of the Armed Forces for the 
hostilities at issue.27 Interpreters agree that the statute is correctly 
understood as communicating the latter proposition28 because the 
(apparent) communicative intention behind the statute is clear.29 As in 
ordinary conversation, what an interpreter cares about is what a 
speaker (here, Congress) “means” in a broad, pragmatic sense.30 
 
RECANATI, LITERAL MEANING 21 (2004) (“[B]y saying that she’s had breakfast, the speaker 
implies that she is not hungry and does not want to be fed. . . . Now th[is] implicature[] can be 
worked out only if the speaker is recognized as expressing the (non-minimal) proposition that 
she’s had breakfast that morning . . . .”). 
 25. See Bach, Content ex Machina, supra note 12, at 38–39. 
 26. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (2012). 
 27. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 28. See, e.g., Presidential Power to Use the Armed Forces Abroad Without Statutory 
Authorization, 4A Op. O.L.C. 185, 196 (1980) (“The practical effect of the 60-day limit is to shift 
the burden to the President to convince the Congress of the continuing need for the use of our 
armed forces abroad.”). 
 29. Interpreters assume that Congress would not intend to enact a requirement that would 
be satisfied in all future cases only by virtue of it having declared war a long time ago. 
 30. In other words, an interpreter is interested in what Professor Richard Fallon refers to as 
a statute’s “contextual meaning.” Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and 
Its Implications for Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235, 1235 (2015). Fallon 
argues that an interpreter might reasonably be interested in a variety of “meanings” when 
interpreting a statute (for example, “literal” meaning, “intended” meaning, “reasonable” 
meaning, or “interpreted” meaning). See id. For reasons articulated below, however, if 
fictionalism is correct, various candidate “meanings” collapse into one (for example, “intended” 
meaning and “reasonable” meaning become one and the same). See infra notes 223–72 and 
accompanying text. 
DOERFLER IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/10/2017  9:27 AM 
2017]    WHO CARES HOW CONGRESS REALLY WORKS? 989 
B. What Congress Asserts 
Even when a speaker uses some sentence literally, one often must 
appeal to the practical context to determine what proposition that 
speaker intends to assert or claim.31 Context, for these purposes, 
consists of the information that is salient to the conversational 
participants.32 And what information is salient depends in part upon 
the shared or individual practical ends of the participants.33 For that 
reason, to determine what a speaker intends to assert, one must 
determine what she and her interlocutors intend to do. 
Courts too must appeal to context to determine what Congress 
(apparently) intends to assert even when they assume that Congress 
uses a sentence literally. As with ordinary conversation, such appeals 
to “context” involve an assessment of what practical ends are at issue. 
Often, courts appeal to context to determine Congress’s 
communicative intent in so-called “hard” cases.34 As the discussion 
below illustrates, however, appeal to context is equally important, but 
often unnoticed, in “easy” cases. First, intent attributions are essential 
to resolving ambiguities that are, intuitively, easy to resolve. Second, 
such attributions help explain why statutes directly communicate more 
information than their bare words might suggest. Third, it is plausible 
that attributing intent is necessary to figure out what Congress means 
as a matter of course—even in cases in which the language Congress 
uses might seem utterly insensitive to context.  
1. Lexical and Structural Ambiguity.  First, appealing to a speaker’s 
practical ends can be necessary for an interlocutor to resolve lexical or 
structural ambiguities in a speaker’s words. Suppose that A says to B, 
 
 31. See Kent Bach, You Don’t Say?, 128 SYNTHESE 15, 28 (2001) (arguing that intuitions 
concerning the truth of a particular utterance pertain to “what the speaker is claiming,” as 
opposed to “what he is saying”). 
 32. Bach, Content ex Machina, supra note 12, at 21 (“What is loosely called ‘context’ is the 
conversational setting broadly construed. It is the mutual cognitive context, or salient common 
ground. It includes . . . salient mutual knowledge between the conversants, and relevant broader 
common knowledge.”). 
 33. See, e.g., Robert C. Stalnaker, Assertion, in CONTEXT AND CONTENT 78, 79 (1999) (“In 
particular inquiries, deliberations, and conversations, alternative states of the subject matter in 
question are conceived in various different ways depending on the interests and attitudes of the 
participants in those activities.” (emphasis added)); Stefano Predelli, Painted Leaves, Context, and 
Semantic Analysis, 28 LINGUISTICS & PHIL. 351, 365 (2005) (observing that one must take into 
account “what intuitively matters” in a conversational context to evaluate the truth of a claim). 
 34. Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1057 (1975) (“The problem of 
justifying judicial decisions is particularly acute in ‘hard cases,’ those cases in which the result is 
not clearly dictated by statute or precedent.”). 
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“I will be at the bank this afternoon.” To resolve the lexical 
ambiguity—that is, whether “bank,” as used, refers to a river side or a 
financial institution—B will appeal to what it is that A plans to do, for 
example, going fishing or completing a financial transaction. Similarly, 
suppose that A cautions B, “Flying planes can be dangerous.” To 
resolve the structural ambiguity—that is, whether the words form a 
sentence that expresses the proposition that the act of flying planes can 
be dangerous or a sentence that expresses the proposition that planes 
that are flying can be dangerous—B must discern A’s apparent end, for 
example, discouraging B from becoming a pilot or persuading B not to 
go skydiving near the airport. 
Courts too must appeal to context to resolve lexical and structural 
ambiguities in Congress’s words. As to lexical ambiguity, appeal to 
context can be necessary when a statute contains a word or phrase that 
has two or more possible meanings. Title VII, for example, states that 
“[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to 
discharge any individual . . . because of such individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.”35 Courts take it as obvious that 
“discharge,” as used, refers to terminating employment as opposed to 
shooting out of a cannon.36 In so doing, courts attribute to Congress 
concern with discriminatory employment (as opposed to ammunition) 
decisions. As to structural ambiguity, courts often must appeal to 
context when a statute contains an adjective, adverb, or prepositional 
phrase adjacent to a list of nouns or verbs. For instance, the federal 
aggravated identity-theft statute mandates an additional term of 
imprisonment of two years for one who “knowingly transfers, 
possesses, or uses” a form of identification of another person without 
lawful authority during or in relation to a covered felony.37 Courts 
rightly treat it as plain that, as used, “knowingly” modifies “transfers,” 
“possesses,” and “uses” instead of only “transfers.”38 In so doing, 
 
 35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012). 
 36. See, e.g., Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 140 (2004); McKennon v. Nashville 
Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 354 (1995). 
 37. 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) (2012). 
 38. See Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 648 (2009) (“All parties agree that 
the provision applies only where the offender knows that he is transferring, possessing, or using 
something.” (emphasis omitted)); cf. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 420, 426–27 (1985) 
(treating it as obvious that the federal statute governing food-stamp fraud, which criminalizes the 
knowing use, transfer, acquisition, alteration, or possession of coupons or authorization cards in 
a manner not authorized by the statute or regulation, applies only to knowing acquisition). 
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courts appeal to what it is that Congress is trying to do, namely to 
punish knowing misconduct.39 
2. Pragmatic Enrichment.  Second, appealing to a speaker’s 
practical ends can be necessary in cases of what some philosophers of 
language call “expansion”40 or “pragmatic enrichment.”41 If A says to 
B, “I’m ready,” one must appeal to features of the practical context to 
determine whether A intends to assert that she is ready to leave for 
dinner, ready to enter the game, or ready to do something else.42 
Appealing to context is necessary to fill in the words the speaker 
omits.43 One can accept this regardless of what proposition one 
understands the sentence “I’m ready” to express in context.44 
Courts similarly must appeal to Congress’s practical ends in such 
cases. Section 102(a) of the Americans with Disabilities Act, for 
example, makes it unlawful for an employer to “discriminate against a 
qualified individual on the basis of disability” with respect to hiring.45 
Courts take it as obvious that, as used, “qualified individual” refers to 
an individual qualified for the position for which she applied, as 
opposed to qualified to operate a motor vehicle or qualified to vote.46 
To arrive at this interpretation, however, one must attribute to 
Congress concern with a particular kind of discrimination, namely 
 
 39. A harder question is whether “knowingly” modifies “without lawful authority” in 
§ 1028A(a)(1). Cf. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 433 (holding that the word “knowingly,” as used in the 
statute governing food-stamp fraud, modified the phrase “in any manner not authorized by 
[law]”). 
 40. Kent Bach, Conversational Impliciture, 9 MIND & LANGUAGE 124, 125–26 (1994) 
[hereinafter Bach, Conversational Impliciture]. 
 41. See generally RECANATI, supra note 24 (“Various pragmatic processes come into play in 
the very determination of what is said . . . [such as] free enrichment and other processes which are 
not linguistically triggered but are pragmatic through and through.”). 
 42. Other examples include sentences such as “Steel isn’t strong enough” and “The princess 
is late.” Bach, Conversational Impliciture, supra note 40, at 127, 128. 
 43. See Kent Bach, Speaking Loosely: Sentence Nonliterality, 25 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 249, 
250 (2001) (“[W]e commonly speak loosely, by omitting words that could have made what we 
meant more explicit, and we let our audience fill in the gaps. Language works far more efficiently 
when we do that.”). 
 44. Compare, e.g., Bach, Conversational Impliciture, supra note 40, at 127 (arguing that such 
sentences fail to express complete propositions), with HERMAN CAPPELEN & ERNIE LEPORE, 
INSENSITIVE SEMANTICS: A DEFENSE OF SEMANTIC MINIMALISM AND SPEECH ACT PLURALISM 
168–69 (2005) (arguing that such sentences express minimal propositions, such as that A is just 
plain ready). 
 45. Americans with Disabilities Act § 102(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 46. Larimer v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 370 F.3d 698, 700 (7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J.) (“The 
term ‘qualified individual’ in that provision must simply mean qualified to do one’s job, as 
assumed though nowhere discussed in the legislative history and the cases.”). 
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hiring discrimination against persons with disabilities who have the 
requisite skills. Examples of this sort abound.47 
3. Radical Contextualism.  Third, appealing to a speaker’s practical 
ends might be necessary as a matter of course.48 Charles Travis has 
offered a variety of ingenious cases to suggest that the proposition 
expressed by a prima facie context-insensitive sentence nonetheless 
varies by context.49 Travis observes, for instance, that whether a 
speaker says something true when uttering the sentence “The leaves 
are green” plausibly depends upon the practical interests at issue: 
Pia’s Japanese maple is full of russet leaves. Believing that green is 
the colour of leaves, she paints them. Returning, she reports, “That’s 
better. The leaves are green now.” She speaks truth. A botanist friend 
then phones, seeking green leaves for a study of green-leaf chemistry. 
“The leaves (on my tree) are green,” Pia says. “You can have those.” 
But now Pia speaks falsehood.50 
One may or may not be convinced that so-called “Travis cases”51 
demonstrate global “semantic underdeterminacy” of sentences.52 One 
must concede, however, that such cases show that appeal to context can 
be—and perhaps is always—necessary to determine what proposition 
 
 47. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 60111(a) (2012) (authorizing the Secretary of Transportation to 
issue notice if an operator of a liquefied natural gas facility lacks “adequate financial responsibility 
for the facility [for safety purposes]”). 
 48. Cf. Bach, Content ex Machina, supra note 12, at 27 (“Any sentence can be used in a 
nonliteral or indirect way. A speaker can always mean something distinct from the semantic 
content of the sentence he is uttering.”). 
 49. Two examples of “Travis cases” are found in Charles Travis, Meaning’s Role in Truth, 
105 MIND 451 (1996) and Charles Travis, On What Is Strictly Speaking True, 15 CAN. J. PHIL. 187 
(1985). 
 50. Charles Travis, Pragmatics, in A COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 87, 
89 (Bob Hale & Crispin Wright eds., 1997). 
 51. E.g., Agustin Vicente, On Travis Cases, 35 LINGUISTICS & PHIL. 3, 4 (2012). 
 52. See, e.g., Martin Montminy, Two Contextualist Fallacies, 173 SYNTHESE 317, 317 (2010) 
(arguing that radical contextualist arguments for global semantic underdeterminacy rest on two 
fallacies); Frederick Schauer, A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1109, 
1120 (2008) (“[T]he ability to understand sentences we have never heard before . . . is [very] 
complex . . . . But anything even residing in the neighborhood of the ‘meaning is use on a particular 
occasion’ view of language fails even to address the compositional problem . . . .”). 
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a speaker intends to assert,53 even if the sentence she utters contains no 
obviously context-sensitive component.54 
Courts must also appeal to context even when Congress uses 
sentences that are prima facie context-insensitive. For example, 
imagine that, during a tour of the White House, A steals a pen from 
the President’s desk. About to exit the property, A is asked to stop by 
a Secret Service officer. A panics and fatally stabs the officer with the 
stolen pen. A then shoves the pen into her bag, jumps into a cab, and 
speeds to the airport. At the airport, A proceeds to the security check, 
when a TSA agent, invoking the federal law prohibiting carrying a 
concealed dangerous weapon on an aircraft, asks her, “Are you 
carrying a dangerous weapon?”55 A says, “No,” speaking truthfully—
as used, “dangerous weapon” refers only to a weapon “that is a ‘deadly 
and dangerous’ weapon per se or inherently so through its 
construction.”56 A continues to the gate and is apprehended by the 
police. Invoking the enhanced-penalty provision of the federal statute 
prohibiting forcible assault on a federal officer, a police officer asks, 
“Are you carrying a dangerous weapon?”57 A says, “No,” speaking 
falsely—as used, “dangerous weapon” refers not only to objects that 
are “inherently deadly” but also those that are “capable of causing 
serious bodily injury or death to another person and [which 
are] . . . use[d] . . . in that manner.”58 
The above example is fantastical, but the principle it illustrates is 
straightforward. Even when a statute uses some prima facie context-
 
 53. Or, perhaps, the truth conditions of what she asserts. See John MacFarlane, Nonindexical 
Contextualism, 166 SYNTHESE 231, 246 (2009) (hypothesizing a “‘counts-as’ parameter” that 
“settles what things have to be like to have various properties: e.g. the property of weighing 160 
pounds, or of being tall”). 
 54. What is distinctive about Travis cases is that they generate intuitions about truth values 
that depend upon context even when the sentence contains no demonstrative, indexical, or other 
value. 
 55. See 49 U.S.C. § 46505(b)(1) (2012) (criminalizing an attempt to board an aircraft while 
concealing a “dangerous weapon” that would be accessible during flight). 
 56. United States v. Dishman, 486 F.2d 727, 730 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that a starter pistol 
incapable of firing a projectile was not a “deadly or dangerous weapon” within the proscription 
of § 46505’s predecessor statute, and reasoning that “the proscribed weapon must be one that is 
a ‘deadly and dangerous’ weapon per se or inherently so through its construction”). 
 57. See 18 U.S.C. § 111(b) (2012) (providing for enhanced penalties where an individual uses 
a “deadly or dangerous weapon” in the course of forcibly assaulting a federal officer). 
 58. United States v. Arrington, 309 F.3d 40, 45 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (emphasis omitted) (holding 
that an automobile may qualify as a “deadly weapon” for purposes of § 111(b) if used as such, 
accepting that “[f]or an object that is not inherently deadly . . . the object must be capable of 
causing serious bodily injury or death to another person and the defendant must use it in that 
manner” (emphasis omitted)). 
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insensitive predicate F—for example, saying that F is a dangerous 
weapon—whether some object X “counts as”59 F may depend upon the 
practical interests implicated by that legislation. So long as there exist 
two practical contexts, one in which “X is F” expresses a truth and one 
in which it expresses a falsehood, one must appeal to context to 
determine whether X “counts as” F for purposes of the statute at issue. 
C. What Congress Implies or Presupposes 
Last, what a speaker intends to communicate often exceeds what 
she actually asserts, in that she intends to communicate multiple 
propositions by uttering a single sentence.60 The most familiar cases 
here are those of “implicature,” a phenomenon famously explored by 
philosopher Paul Grice.61 Implicature is a form of indirect 
communication. If A asks B, “Would you like coffee or tea?” and B 
responds, “I would like coffee,” all agree that B has not asserted the 
proposition that B would not like tea, although all agree that B intends 
to communicate that proposition.62 Using implicature to communicate 
more than one asserts advances a variety of ends, including verbal 
efficiency.63 
Courts likewise regularly attribute to Congress an intention to 
communicate more than it asserts. In particular, courts recognize many 
of the same sorts of Gricean implicatures as do interlocutors in 
ordinary conversation. When a statute contains a provision defining its 
preemptive reach, courts will assume that Congress does not intend to 
preempt matters outside that reach.64 Or where a statute expressly 
 
 59. MacFarlane, supra note 53, at 246. 
 60. See STEPHEN C. LEVINSON, PRESUMPTIVE MEANINGS: THE THEORY OF GENERALIZED 
CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE 28–31 (2000); cf. Elisabeth Camp, Metaphor and That Certain 
‘Je Ne Sais Quoi,’ 129 PHIL. STUD. 1, 3 (2006) (“Because metaphorical utterances . . . express such 
complex contents in so few words, they are highly efficient vehicles for communication.”). 
 61. See generally H.P. Grice, Logic and Conversation, in 3 SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS: 
SPEECH ACTS 41 (Peter Cole & Jerry L. Morgan eds., 1975) (exploring the phenomenon of 
“implicature”). 
 62. See id. at 45 (identifying the maxim of “quantity,” which maintains that one should 
“[m]ake [one’s] contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the 
exchange)”). 
 63. See, e.g., PENELOPE BROWN & STEPHEN C. LEVINSON, POLITENESS: SOME UNIVERSALS 
IN LANGUAGE USAGE 132–44 (1987) (arguing that indirect speech can be used to promote the 
value of politeness). 
 64. Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992) (“Congress’ enactment of a 
provision defining the pre-emptive reach of a statute implies that matters beyond that reach are 
not pre-empted.”). 
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creates a right, courts will assume that Congress intends there to be a 
corresponding remedy.65 
Scholars dispute whether Grice’s account of implicature “readily 
translate[s] from the conversational setting to the complex, multilateral 
bargaining process of framing a statute.”66 All agree, however, that 
implicature does and should play some role in statutory 
interpretation—no one disputes that the application of the expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius canon is legitimate in some cases.67 As in the 
conversational context, the use of implicature, however restricted, 
promotes verbal efficiency.68 To require that legislation make explicit 
every proposition communicated would be cumbersome, if not 
practically impossible. 
*   *   * 
Statutory interpretation as practiced involves widespread 
attribution of legislative intent. First, in all cases, what is of interest to 
an interpreter is the proposition that Congress (apparently) intends to 
 
 65. See Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39–40 (1916) (inferring a private right of 
action from a statutory requirement, reasoning that “[t]his is but an application of the maxim, Ubi 
jus ibi remedium,” that is, where there is a right there is a remedy). 
 66. Manning, supra note 11, at 2462 n.274; see also Andrei Marmor, Can the Law Imply More 
Than It Says? On Some Pragmatic Aspects of Strategic Speech, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW 83, 83 (Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011) (arguing that, 
unlike ordinary conversation, conversation in the legal context is often strategic and so allows for 
only limited pragmatic inference); SCOTT SOAMES, Interpreting Legal Texts: What Is, and What Is 
Not, Special About the Law, in 1 PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS: NATURAL LANGUAGE: WHAT IT 
MEANS AND HOW WE USE IT 403, 422 (2008) (“The legislative process is governed by purposes 
that transcend . . . the conversational ideal of the efficient and cooperative exchange of 
information. Consequently, the way in which conversational maxims . . . contribute to filling the 
gap between the meaning and content of legal texts may . . . differ from their contribution 
to . . . ordinary conversations.”). 
 67. This canon of statutory interpretation is the principle that, when one or more things of a 
class are expressly mentioned, others of the same class which are not mentioned are excluded. 
For a discussion of the legitimacy of the maxim of negative implication, see John F. Manning, The 
New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 179. Manning writes: 
  Consider the once-dreaded maxim of negative implication, expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius. The specification of one thing surely does not always mean the 
exclusion of others. . . . Still, while there is no master rule that can tell us when the 
maxim applies, that does not mean that skilled users of language are utterly unable to 
identify when a speaker has used language in a way that creates a negative implication. 
We do so all the time. Sometimes the maxim’s applicability is obvious; other times, it is 
subject to reasonable disagreement. 
Id. at 179 (footnotes omitted). 
 68. Less clear is whether values such as politeness are implicated by the legislative context. 
See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
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communicate as opposed to the proposition expressed by the sentence 
Congress used. Second, in most cases, an interpreter must attribute to 
Congress various practical intentions69 to attribute to it a 
communicative intention. Attributions of practical intent are often 
latent. Such attributions are, however, necessary if one is to understand 
legislation as an effective means of communication, which, as a matter 
of positive law, courts plainly do.70 It is possible—though, in the 
author’s view, highly doubtful—that courts are mistaken in thinking of 
legislation as a means of communication.71 “Legislation as 
communication” has intuitive appeal, however, and is, for that reason, 
the “standard picture” among legal theorists.72 In addition, it is the “law 
 
 69. This Article uses the phrase “practical intention” to refer to both general and specific 
practical aims. As used, the phrase encompasses what Professor Mark Greenberg and others refer 
to as “legal intention,” which is the intention to alter legal rights or obligations in a particular way. 
Mark Greenberg, Legislation as Communication? Legal Interpretation and the Study of Linguistic 
Communication, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW, supra note 66, 
at 217, 242. To go back to the WPR example, the intention that one attributes to Congress to limit 
the president’s authority to use the Armed Forces in certain circumstances without congressional 
approval is plausibly a legal intention in Greenberg’s sense. Nonetheless, this Article 
characterizes it as a practical intention for the reason that it is intuitively glossed as what Congress 
is trying to do, as opposed to what Congress is attempting to say. Of course, one could attribute 
to Congress, on the basis of its enacting the WPR, the more general practical intention of 
maintaining the separation of powers or reducing the frequency of significant military 
intervention. The point here is just that the phrase “practical intention,” as used, is not limited to 
such general aims or purposes. 
 70. See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2494 n.4 (2015) (“Congress said expressly that 
it wanted to avoid adverse selection in the health insurance markets.” (emphasis omitted)); 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2774 (2014) (“Congress speaks with 
specificity when it intends a religious accommodation not to extend to for-profit corporations.”); 
Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 858 (2000) (“Congress should have spoken in language that 
is clear and definite . . . .” (quoting United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 
221–22 (1952))); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984) 
(“First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at 
issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter . . . .”); United States v. Nat’l 
City Lines, Inc., 337 U.S. 78, 84 (1949) (“Congress indeed meant what it said.”); United States v. 
Am. Sugar Ref. Co., 202 U.S. 563, 577 (1906) (“[I]t is the meaning of Congress . . . we are to 
ascertain.”); The Kensington, 183 U.S. 263, 274 (1902) (“Congress meant by the[se] words . . . but 
one thing . . . .”). 
 71. For arguments that legislation should not be regarded as a means of communication, see 
generally Greenberg, supra note 69; Heidi M. Hurd, Sovereignty in Silence, 99 YALE L.J. 945 
(1990). Assessing the merits of these arguments goes beyond the scope of this Article. 
 72. Mark Greenberg, The Moral Impact Theory of the Law, 123 YALE L.J. 1288, 1296–97 
(2014) (describing the “standard picture” as the view that “the content of the law is primarily 
constituted by linguistic (or mental) contents associated with the authoritative legal texts,” and 
observing that the picture “has deep roots in ordinary thought about the law” and is 
“encapsulated in the layperson’s idea that the law is what the code or law books say”). 
DOERFLER IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/10/2017  9:27 AM 
2017]    WHO CARES HOW CONGRESS REALLY WORKS? 997 
of interpretation” within our federal system73 or the positive law of 
“what the [statutory] law is.”74 For these reasons, this Article assumes 
arguendo the picture of legislation as communication. And, given that 
picture, attributions of legislative intent, both communicative and 
practical, are to a large degree unavoidable. 
Among other things, the above-identified need to attribute to 
Congress practical intentions calls into question the textualist claim 
that, when interpreting a statute, one should prioritize so-called 
“semantic context” over “policy context.”75 According to Professor 
John Manning, semantic context consists of “evidence that goes to the 
way a reasonable person would use language under the 
circumstances.”76 Included in semantic context are such things as 
“dictionary definitions,” “specialized trade usage,” and “colloquial 
nuances that may be widely understood but that are unrecorded in 
standard dictionaries.”77 Policy context, by contrast, consists of 
“evidence that suggests the way a reasonable person would address the 
mischief being remedied.”78 Within the ambit of “policy context” are 
matters such as public knowledge of the mischief the lawmakers 
sought to address; the way competing interpretations of a discrete 
statutory provision fit with the policy reflected in the statute’s 
preamble, title, or overall structure; and the way alternative readings 
of the statute fit with the policy expressed in similar statutes.79 
Manning argues, “When contextual evidence of semantic usage 
points decisively in one direction, that evidence takes priority over 
 
 73. William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 56) (on file with the Duke Law Journal); see generally William 
Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349 (2015) (articulating a positive-law 
argument for originalism about constitutional interpretation); Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a 
Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817 (2015) (same). 
 74. See Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 32 (2009) (noting the 
distinction “between what the law is and what judges should do” when interpreting a legal text). 
 75. See John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 
70, 76 (2006) (“Textualists give precedence to semantic context . . . . Purposivists give priority to 
policy context . . . .”); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Three Symmetries Between Textualist and 
Purposivist Theories of Statutory Interpretation—and the Irreducible Roles of Values and 
Judgment Within Both, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 685, 693 (2014) (observing that “Professor 
Manning’s distinction between semantic contexts and policy contexts ha[s] achieved broad 
acceptance”). 
 76. Manning, supra note 75, at 76. 
 77. Id. at 92. 
 78. Id. at 76. 
 79. Id. at 93. 
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contextual evidence that relates to questions of policy.”80 But what 
Travis cases suggest is that one must, in nearly all cases, determine 
what a speaker intends to do in order to determine what she intends to 
say.81 In most cases, what a speaker intends to do is obvious, making 
the corresponding determination unthinking or automatic. 
Nonetheless, it is a determination a listener must make.  
With respect to statutes, the arguments above suggest that 
“evidence of semantic usage”82 is rarely clear when considered apart 
from evidence of “the mischief being remedied.”83 Often, that mischief 
will be apparent and will not require conscious consideration, but even 
in easy cases, a listener must still consider what the legislature intends 
to do. The question remains what sources an interpreter should 
consider to make sense of a statute. The claim in this Part is that, in 
most cases, one cannot determine how “a reasonable person would use 
language under the circumstances” apart from evidence of purpose, 
whatever the source. 
II.  CONGRESS HAS NO INTENTIONS 
Part I argues that attributions of legislative intent are widespread 
and seemingly unavoidable. As this Part explains, the problem is that 
the U.S. Congress reliably has no intentions. The Constitution vests the 
legislative power in Congress as a single body. And on any plausible 
account of shared agency, Congress as structured is reliably incapable 
of forming collective intentions other than the bare intention to enact 
text into law. As a consequence, attributions to Congress of legislative 
intent are reliably false.  
This Part starts by explaining that, for constitutional purposes, 
Congress is an “it,” not a “they.” Next, it briefly surveys traditional, 
public-choice-theory arguments for skepticism about legislative intent. 
It then goes on to argue that a basic premise of those traditional 
skeptical arguments is at odds with contemporary philosophical work 
 
 80. Id. at 92–93. 
 81. This need cuts against the argument voiced by Professor Joseph Raz, that legislative 
intent “plays no real role” in interpretation because, barring specific exceptions, “one means what 
one says.” RAZ, supra note 7, at 286–87; see also id. at 287 (“[T]he normal way of finding out what 
a person intended to say is to establish what he said. The thought that the process can be reversed 
mistakes the exceptional case . . . for the normal case.”). If determining what a speaker “says” 
requires attention to the practical circumstances in most cases, Congress’s practical ends have an 
important role in interpretation most of the time. 
 82. Manning, supra note 75, at 92–93. 
 83. Id. at 76. 
DOERFLER IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/10/2017  9:27 AM 
2017]    WHO CARES HOW CONGRESS REALLY WORKS? 999 
on collective intention. Finally, it argues that recent efforts to 
rehabilitate legislative intent—efforts attentive to the philosophical 
work just mentioned—also fail because of structural dissimilarities 
between Congress and other actors, like corporations. 
A. Congress Is an “It,” Not a “They” 
As far as the Constitution is concerned, Congress is an “it,” not a 
“they.” Article I, Section 1 vests all granted legislative powers in “a 
Congress.”84 The Constitution also specifies various things that “the 
Congress” may or shall do.85 In each instance, the Constitution refers 
to Congress as a single body as opposed to a collection of individuals. 
These uses of “Congress” thus contrast with familiar cases in which 
“Congress” is used to make generalizations about the individuals who 
make up that body.  
To illustrate, when a disgruntled citizen says, “Congress is out of 
touch,”86 her claim is best understood as stating that most members of 
Congress are out of touch.87 So taken, the claim that Congress is 
corrupt is akin to the claim that ravens are black or that the Twelfth 
Man cheers the Seattle Seahawks; it is a generic ascription of a trait to 
the individuals that constitute the referenced set.88 By contrast, when 
the Constitution says that “the Congress may . . . establish [inferior 
courts],”89 the takeaway is not that a generic member of Congress may 
establish such a court on her own. Rather, it is that Congress may do 
so as a body, much in the same way that the Villanova Wildcats may 
win the NCAA championship or the Supreme Court may grant 
certiorari. 
 
 84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 85. See, e.g., id. § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes . . . .”); 
id. cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have the Power . . . [t]o establish Post Offices and post Roads . . . .”); 
id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[T]he Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, 
as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of 
Departments.”). 
 86. Luellen Matthews, Letter to the Editor, A Congress Out of Touch with America, WASH. 
POST (June 24, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-congress-out-of-touch-with-
america/2014/06/24/4b1a8fae-fadb-11e3-9f27-09f20b8bfd1a_atory.html [https://perma.cc/P85V-9
25Z]. 
 87. See id. (supporting the claim that Congress is out of touch with the assertion that “House 
Majority Leader Eric Cantor (Va.) is so out of touch that he lost in the Republican primary and 
did not even get to the general election”). 
 88. See Sarah-Jane Leslie, Generics, ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 
(Edward Craig ed., 2011), http://www.rep.routledge.com/artciel/U059 [https://perma.cc/489M- 
DGV3]. 
 89. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
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The above might seem obvious. One must bear it in mind, 
however, when thinking about the slogan that Congress is a “they,” not 
an “it.”90 As discussed below, that slogan was introduced as a banner 
for skepticism about legislative intent. But as this slogan has come to 
be a truism that is accepted even by many who find the ability to 
attribute legislative intent unproblematic, the thesis that Congress is a 
“they” makes little sense.91 If the legislative power belongs to Congress 
as a single body, the choice is stark: either Congress forms intentions 
qua “it” or there is no legislative intent. 
B. Traditional Skepticism About Legislative Intent 
Traditional skepticism about legislative intent is rooted in 
skepticism about the aggregability of individual legislators’ attitudes.92 
In one form, this skepticism fixes on legislator preference within the 
limited realm of the options presented to them. As public-choice 
theorists observe, majority preference of a legislative body need not be 
transitive—that is, a majority of legislators might prefer X to Y, Y to 
Z, and Z to X all at the same time.93 For this reason, the legislative 
process is susceptible to “cycling”—a vote for X over Y, followed by a 
vote for Z over X, followed by a vote for Y over Z, followed by a vote 
for X over Y—unless structured to produce a final vote.94 But this 
process means that legislative outcomes might be owed to agenda 
setting,95 making it impossible to “differentiate” in any given case “the 
 
 90. Shepsle, supra note 6. 
 91. See, e.g., Bressman & Gluck, Part II, supra note 19, at 737 (acknowledging “Kenneth 
Shepsle’s famous insight that ‘Congress is a they, not an it’’’ (quoting Shepsle, supra note 6, at 
239)); McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 
80 GEO. L.J. 705, 711 (1992) (“As Kenneth Shepsle reminds us, ‘Congress is a they, not an it.’” 
(quoting Shepsle, supra note 6, at 239)). 
 92. In other words, skepticism about the possibility of summing up the attitudes of individual 
legislators for purposes of identifying a consensus or majority attitude. Traditional skepticism has 
historical roots in an influential article written by Professor Max Radin. See Max Radin, Statutory 
Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870 (1930) (“The chances that of several hundred men each 
will have exactly the same determinate situations in mind as possible reductions of a given 
determinable, are infinitesimally small.”). 
 93. See Shepsle, supra note 6, at 241–44; see also Leo Katz, A Theory of Loopholes, 39 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1, 11–12 (2010) (providing an illustration). 
 94. Shepsle, supra note 6, at 241–44. 
 95. Id. at 246 (noting the “structural advantages of agenda setters, both in determining what 
the full chamber may vote on and when (proposal power), and more subtly on what the full 
chamber may not vote on (veto power)”); see also Easterbrook, supra note 11, at 547–48 
(“Legislatures customarily consider proposals one at a time . . . . Additional options can be 
considered only in sequence, and this makes the order of decision vital.”). 
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‘will of the majority’ from the machinations . . . of agenda setters.”96 
Additionally, legislative outcomes might be owed to “logrolling,” 
which is the strategic trading of votes between legislators.97 By design, 
logrolling “yields unanimity on every recorded vote,” thereby masking 
substantive policy disagreement.98 “[T]he legislative process is 
submerged and courts lose the information they need to divine the 
body’s design.”99 Or so the argument goes. 
In its other form, traditional skepticism about the aggregability of 
attitudes of individual legislators fixes on legislator intention. The 
legislative process does not require legislators to prefer one policy to 
another for the same reasons.100 Even when substantive policy 
preferences align, different legislators might have different ends in 
mind—for instance, Legislator A might prefer policy X to policy Y 
because she believes policy X will be more effective, although 
Legislator B might do so because she believes that policy X will be less 
effective but an adequate fig leaf.101 In such a scenario, “there is not a 
single legislative intent, but rather many legislators’ intents.”102 And 
one simply has no way of ensuring that such a scenario does not 
obtain.103 
 
 96. Shepsle, supra note 6, at 248. 
 97. Easterbrook, supra note 11, at 548. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See Shepsle, supra note 6, at 244 (“[T]he winning majority consists of many legislators; 
their respective reasons for voting against the status quo may well be as varied as their number.”); 
see also Timothy W. Grinsell, Linguistics and Legislative Intent 8 (July 24, 2014) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=2471026 [https://perma.cc/6CZL-YQ82] (“Shepsle and 
Easterbrook both treat the problem of ‘many intents’ as independent of the Arrowian-based 
argument. To some degree, it is: individual legislators may have the same ranking of proposals 
for entirely different reasons.” (footnote omitted)). 
 101. See, e.g., Steve Levine & Esmé E. Deprez, Health-Care Cooperatives: Fig Leaf or  
Fix?, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 18, 2009), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2009-08-18/health-
care-cooperatives-fig-leaf-or-fix-businessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice 
[https://perma.cc/Y8QC-MSZC] (discussing, in the context of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), 
whether proposed healthcare cooperatives are an effective substitute for previously advocated 
public-insurance options). 
 102. Shepsle, supra note 6, at 244 (emphasis omitted). 
 103. For an example, see id. Shepsle states: 
When a bill passes the House and Senate in the same form, and is signed by the 
president, there are only limited inferences to be drawn. We know that one majority in 
each chamber has revealed a “preference” for the bill over x0. We do not know why, 
and it is likely that each legislator has a mix of different reasons. 
Id. 
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Traditional skepticism has drawn various responses. Some have 
questioned the frequency with which cycling occurs in practice. 
Professors Daniel Farber and Philip Frickey, for example, maintain 
that social-choice theory’s predictions of arbitrariness and instability 
are “markedly inconsistent with our empirical knowledge of 
legislatures such as the U.S. Congress.”104 Others, such as Justice 
Stephen Breyer, have insisted that fears ought to be dispelled simply 
by the familiar practice of attributing intentions to multimember 
bodies such as corporations.105  
Still others have observed that the possibility of cycling is not 
unique to the decisions of multimember bodies. Linguist Timothy 
Grinsell explains that cycling can occur when individuals apply 
multicriterial predicates—predicates that denote a decision function 
aggregating multiple criteria into a single judgment, such as “healthy” 
or “nice.”106 Because we have no difficulty attributing coherent 
intentions to individuals who apply such predicates, Grinsell argues, 
the mere possibility of cycling cannot be enough to render problematic 
attributions of intentions to legislatures.107 
The above responses have drawn their own responses.108 What this 
Part suggests, however, is that this whole dialectic misses the 
fundamental problem with attributions of legislative intent. A premise 
of traditional skepticism about legislative intent that has gone 
unquestioned by the abovementioned respondents is that the 
aggregability of legislator attitudes is a necessary—and perhaps 
sufficient—condition for legislative intent. That premise is squarely at 
odds with philosophical accounts of shared agency, which recognize 
 
 104. Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. 
REV. 423, 429 (1988) (quoting William H. Panning, Formal Models of Legislative Processes, in 
HANDBOOK OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH 680, 689 (Gernard Loewenberg, Samuel C. Patterson 
& Malcolm E. Jewell eds., 1985)). 
 105. STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 99 (2010) 
(reasoning that “[c]orporations, companies, partnerships, municipalities, states, nations, armies, 
bar associations, and legislatures engage in intentional activities, such as buying, selling, 
promising, endorsing, questioning, undertaking, repudiating, and legislating”). 
 106. Grinsell, supra note 100, at 14–15. 
 107. See id. at 3 (“Since . . . the public choice argument applies with equal force to decisions 
made by legislatures and to decisions made by individuals, the notions of legislative intent and 
individual intent stand or fall together. And we should let them stand.” (footnote omitted)). 
 108. See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Public Choice Defended, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 777, 789–93 (2005) 
(arguing that cycling can be common and is often unseen because it is pushed back in the 
legislative process); Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Structure-Induced Equilibrium 
and Legislative Choice, 37 PUB. CHOICE 503, 504, 516–17 (1981) (arguing that the absence of 
apparent cycling does not imply the absence of preferences that induce cycling). 
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that aggregability is neither necessary nor sufficient for there to be 
shared intentions. 
C. Accounts of Shared Agency 
Sometimes we act side by side. Other times we act together. 
Philosophical accounts of shared agency try to make sense of the 
difference. 
Take philosopher Margaret Gilbert’s example of taking a walk.109 
Suppose that you and I walk next to each other through the park but 
each of us is unaware of or indifferent to the other, making it so we 
each walk alone in some sense.110 Suppose now that you and I each walk 
the same path but do so as part of a date. In this case, you and I walk 
together in the sense that we are engaged in a “shared cooperative 
activity.”111 In each case, our external behavior is the same. Yet our 
respective intentions differ.112 In the first case, I intend that I walk 
through the park and you intend that you do the same. In the second 
case, each of us intends that we walk through the park. It is this “we-
intention,”113 philosophers suggest, that distinguishes our shared 
cooperative activity from a “mere summation or heap of individual 
acts.”114 
 
 109. See generally Margaret Gilbert, Walking Together: A Paradigmatic Social Phenomenon, 
15 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 1 (1990) (using the example of taking a walk to explore shared action). 
 110. Margaret Gilbert provides an example of this phenomenon: 
Imagine that Sue Jones is out for a walk along Horsebarn Road on her own. Suddenly 
she realizes that someone else—a man in a black cloak—has begun to walk alongside 
her, about a foot away. His physical proximity is clearly not enough to make it the case 
that they are going for a walk together. It may disturb Sue precisely because they are 
not going for a walk together. 
Id. at 2 (emphasis omitted). 
 111. See generally Michael E. Bratman, Shared Cooperative Activity, 101 PHIL. REV. 327 
(1992) (discussing shared cooperative activity). 
 112. See Searle, supra note 5, at 402–03 (discussing analogous examples and saying that 
“[e]xternally observed the two cases are [indistinguishable], but they are clearly different 
internally”). 
 113. Id. at 404. 
 114. Abraham S. Roth, Shared Agency, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2011), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/shared-agency [https://perma.cc/5SNM-P7NR]. 
Philosophers disagree about whether we-intentions can be reduced to ordinary individual 
intentions. Compare, e.g., BRATMAN, supra note 5, at 4 (“[I]ndividual planning agency brings with 
it sufficiently rich structures—conceptual, metaphysical, and normative—that the further step to 
basic forms of sociality, while significant and demanding, need not involve fundamentally new 
elements.”), with Searle, supra note 5, at 406–07 (arguing that “we-intentions are a primitive 
phenomenon” and that we-intentions are “not reducible to I-intentions plus mutual beliefs”). 
Where philosophers agree is that some sort of “participatory intention” is a necessary condition 
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For there to be shared cooperative activity, we-intentions must be 
shared. At a minimum,115 for a single body as such to φ,116 its 
members—either all or sufficiently many117—must each intend that 
“we” φ.118 In addition, each member’s intention that “we” φ must be 
transparent, so each member must recognize that every other member 
also intends that “we” φ.119 Hence, if each of us intends that we walk 
through the park but each keeps that intention a secret, we do not walk 
as a joint venture. Last, members must intend to coordinate their 
efforts toward φing.120 We do not share an intention that we walk 
through the park if we make no effort to walk at the same pace. Nor, 
to use a legislative example, do we share an intention to improve the 
healthcare system if we do not even try to coordinate our efforts. 
 
of shared agency. Christopher Kutz, Acting Together, 61 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 1, 
3 (2000). 
 115. This Article identifies only certain necessary conditions of shared agency. What 
conditions suffice for shared agency goes beyond the scope of this Article and is a matter of 
philosophical dispute. 
 116. As used here, φ denotes some action—for example, to walk, to talk, or to enact 
legislation. 
 117. Whether an intention need be shared by all or sufficiently many members to be 
attributed to a group plausibly depends upon whether that group is “ephemeral” or 
“institutional.” See Kutz, supra note 114, at 28. Ephemeral groups, according to Professor 
Christopher Kutz, “are groups whose identity as a group consists just in the fact that a set of 
persons is acting jointly,” like a group pushing a car. Id. Institutional groups, by contrast, have 
additional identity criteria (for example, to be a member of the U.S. Senate, it is not enough for 
one to “intentionally participat[e] in its deliberations”; one must instead be elected in accordance 
with the operative elections procedures). Id. at 28–29. In the case of ephemeral groups, it seems 
straightforward that all members of a group must share an intention to φ for that intention to be 
attributed to the group. What makes that group a group, after all, is just its shared intention to φ. 
Compare this to institutional groups like the U.S. Senate. Because the Senate exists as a group 
for reasons apart from its members’ shared intention to φ, it is at least plausible that one could 
attribute to the Senate an intention to φ if a large enough subset of senators shared that intention. 
This Article need not answer this question. 
 118. See BRATMAN, supra note 5, at 152 (identifying as a sufficient condition of shared agency 
that “[w]e each have intentions that we J”); GILBERT, supra note 5, at 7 (“[I]n the process of joint 
commitment, two or more people jointly commit the same two or more people.” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
 119. See, e.g., GILBERT, supra note 5, at 7 (“In the basic case [of joint commitment], . . . each 
makes clear to each his personal readiness to contribute to it, in a way that is entirely out in the 
open to all.”); Michael E. Bratman, Shared Intention, 104 ETHICS 97, 99 n.8 (1993) (identifying 
“common knowledge” as a necessary condition of shared agency). 
 120. Bratman posits the following scenario in BRATMAN, supra note 5: 
If we share an intention to go to NYC, and if you intend that we go to NYC by taking 
the New Jersey local train while I intend that we go by taking the Amtrak train, we 
have a problem. In a case of shared intention we will normally try to resolve that 
problem by making adjustments in one or both of these sub-plans, perhaps by the way 
of bargaining, in the direction of co-possibility. 
Id. at 53. 
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Whenever there is an instance of shared cooperative activity, one 
can, in a minimal sense, correctly attribute an intentional action to a 
single body. When you and I walk through the park together, one can 
truthfully say that we walk through the park in a way that one cannot 
when you and I merely walk side by side. Likewise, whenever one can 
correctly attribute an intentional action to a single body, one can, 
again, in a minimal sense, correctly attribute an intention to that single 
body. Hence, when we walk through the park, one can ascribe to us the 
intention to do so in a way that one cannot when you and I each walk 
alone.  
Philosophers disagree as to whether and to what extent collective 
action must involve collective agents,121 as well as to whether and under 
what conditions it makes sense to regard a single body as constituting 
a “group mind” to which one can reasonably attribute cognitive 
attitudes.122 This Article need not wade into these discussions. For 
present purposes, to say that a single body as such φs is just to say that 
its members φ as a shared cooperative activity. In turn, to say that a 
single body intends to φ is just to say that its members share an 
intention to φ as a single body, that its members share a we-intention 
to φ. If one accepts that there is such a thing as shared cooperative 
activity,123 one can and should accept such minimal claims. 
 
 121. Compare Philip Pettit & David Schweikard, Joint Actions and Group Agents, 36 PHIL. 
SOC. SCI. 18, 30 (2006) (seeing “no metaphysical reason why a joint intentional action has to be 
the product of a single agent”), with MARGARET GILBERT, What Is It for Us to Intend?, in 
SOCIALITY AND RESPONSIBILITY: NEW ESSAYS IN PLURAL SUBJECT THEORY 14, 22 (2000) 
(reasoning that, if there is shared intentional activity, there is a “plural subject” of that shared 
intention). 
 122. Compare BRATMAN, supra note 5: 
Should we say . . . that the group agent of the shared intentional action is the subject of 
this intention? 
  I think that this is not in general true: in modest sociality there need not be a group 
subject who has the shared intention. To talk of a subject who intends is to see that 
subject as a center of a more or less coherent mental web of, at the least, intentions and 
cognitions. The idea of a subject who intends X but has few other intentional 
attitudes—who intends X in the absence of a mental web of that subject in which this 
intention is located—seems a mistake. 
Id. at 127, with GILBERT, supra note 121, at 14 (articulating “an account of a shared intention as 
the intention of a plural subject” (first emphasis added)). 
 123. As opposed to, say, mere “strategic interaction.” BRATMAN, supra note 5, at 92 (“A 
central thought of this discussion is that modest sociality, while consisting in appropriate forms of 
interconnected planning agency, is not merely strategic interaction within a context of common 
knowledge.”); see also Natalie Gold & Robert Sugden, Collective Intentions and Team Agency, 
66 J. PHIL. 109, 109 (2007) (“A general problem for . . . accounts [of shared agency] is how to 
differentiate collective intentions from the mutually-consistent individual intentions that lie 
behind Nash equilibrium behavior in games.”). 
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Questioning the applicability of the above model of shared agency 
to large groups, Professor Christopher Kutz argues that a shared 
intention to φ is too strong a condition for a single body to φ in the case 
of an orchestra. Kutz reasons that, because the contribution of an 
individual member to the group’s φing is minimal, it makes no sense 
for her to intend to make it the case that the group φs.124 As a weaker 
alternative, Kutz proposes that members need to share an intention to 
do their respective parts in φing for the single body to φ.125 Kutz’s 
argument rests on disputable linguistic intuitions.126 Regardless, Kutz’s 
“minimal contribution” concern127 has little purchase as to legislation, 
where each member’s “contribution,” or vote, is conditional on enough 
other members contributing to the same cause. 
Professor Scott Shapiro similarly contends that a shared intention 
to φ is too strong a condition for large groups because single body φing 
can occur even when some members of a single body are “alienated,” 
in the sense of doing their part despite being apathetic or even hostile 
to the project of φing.128 As a motivating example, Shapiro imagines 
two unaffiliated contractors each being paid $1,000 to do “what [the 
hiring party] tells him to do.”129 The hiring party tells one contractor to 
scrape the old paint off his house and the other to paint a new coat on 
the scraped surface.130 Each does as he is told. From this conduct, 
Shapiro infers that the contractors “have intentionally painted the 
house together.”131 This is the case, Shapiro continues, even though the 
contractor scraping the paint was indifferent to whether the other 
contractor applied the paint.132 
The problem with Shapiro’s example is that it conflates 
“intentionally brought about” with “brought about by intentional 
 
 124. See CHRISTOPHER KUTZ, COMPLICITY: ETHICS AND LAW FOR A COLLECTIVE AGE 98 
(Gerald Postema ed., 2000) (claiming that for “an individual cellist” to intend that “[the orchestra] 
play the Eroica” would be for the cellist to “take too grandiose a view of his or her role”). 
 125. Id. at 98–99. 
 126. See id. at 98 (claiming that it would “ring false” to attribute to an individual cellist the 
intention that “we play the Eroica”). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Scott J. Shapiro, Massively Shared Agency, in RATIONAL AND SOCIAL AGENCY: ESSAYS 
ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF MICHAEL BRATMAN 257, 270 (Manuel Vargas & Gideon Yaffe eds., 
2014). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 271 (“[The contractor] do[es]n’t care a wit about painting the house, only [about] 
getting [his] money.”). 
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activity.” In the example, each contractor acts intentionally: the first 
contractor intentionally scrapes off the old paint and the second 
contractor intentionally applies the new. What results is a newly 
painted house with an old coat properly removed and a new coat 
applied. That result was reasonably foreseeable to each. But the newly 
painted house was not brought about intentionally, at least not as far 
as the first contractor is concerned. Rather, the newly painted house is 
merely the foreseeable result of the two contractors’ strategic 
interaction.133  
There is, though, some truth to Shapiro’s more general 
observation. It is plausible to attribute to an institutional group an 
intention to φ despite some members of that group failing to intend 
that “we” φ.134 One can imagine scenarios in which an institutional 
group might intend to φ despite some of its members being “alienated” 
from the project of φing. If most members of Congress were to vote for 
a gun bill with the intention that “we” facilitate the purchase of assault 
rifles, it would be plausible to attribute to Congress the intention to 
facilitate the purchase of assault rifles even if a handful of members 
instead begrudgingly voted in favor to preserve their National Rifle 
Association “grades.”135  
Return now to traditional skepticism about legislative intent. As 
noted in the above discussion of shared agency, neither preference nor 
intention aggregability is a sufficient condition for there to be 
legislative intent. Consider the motivating example of taking a walk. If 
you and I walk through the park side by side but are unaware of the 
other, each of us prefers walking to other activities (assume for the sake 
of argument that our alternatives are the same). More to the point,136 
each of us intends to walk through the park. As such, both our 
preferences and intentions are aggregable in the way that the 
traditional skeptic demands.137 In this case, however, we do not intend 
to walk through the park together—even if you and I each do indeed 
intend to walk through the park. 
 
 133. See supra note 123. 
 134. See supra note 117. 
 135. See Matthew Bloch, Hannah Fairfield, Jacob Harris, Josh Keller & Derek Willis, How 
the N.R.A. Rates Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2012/12/19/us/politics/nra.html [https://perma.cc/QU5T-JDFL]. 
 136. See supra notes 109–15 and accompanying text. 
 137. That is, aggregable in terms of the activity preferred or intended, without regard to 
whether that activity is conceived of as individual or joint. See Shepsle, supra note 6, at 244–45. 
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What of necessity? At one level, the aggregability of legislator 
intention is, by definition, a necessary condition of legislative intent on 
the account of shared agency just discussed: if a single body intends to 
φ only if its members share an intention that “we” φ, then, for all cases 
in which Congress intends to φ, its members’ respective intentions to 
φ will be aggregable. In relation to traditional skepticism of legislative 
intent, however, saying that shared agency entails intention 
aggregability is misleading. Traditional skeptical arguments all have to 
do with the aggregability of substantive policy preferences or 
intentions.138 But, for reasons touched on by Professor Lawrence Solan, 
a legislature might intend a substantive policy without all or even a 
majority of legislators ever having seriously considered that policy.139 
Solan observes that members of Congress might share an intention to 
enact some policy X with the policy’s details to be determined by a 
specific member, subset of members, or, conceivably, nonmember 
third party—for example, an executive branch official or a lobbyist.140 
In so doing, Congress would exercise shared agency in much the same 
way as you and I do if each of us intends that we take a trip but I leave 
to you the choice of destination.141 In either case, members of the single 
body share a we-intention that commits them to something specific 
without ever having to contemplate—let alone prefer or intend—that 
specific thing. 
D. New Skepticism About Shared Legislative Intent 
Congress does sometimes act as an “it.” When Congress takes an 
up-or-down vote on a particular bill, its members share a conditional 
intention that “we” approve the bill if it receives the requisite number 
of votes. Casting a vote with this intention is the same as casting a vote 
 
 138. See id. at 241–44 (constructing an Arrowian dilemma around intransitivity of substantive 
policy preferences). 
 139. See Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language, Public Laws: The Central Role of Legislative 
Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L.J. 427, 437–49 (2005). 
 140. Solan explains: 
While committees will often be at the center of this inquiry, this will not always be the 
case. Sometimes, for example, the administration may propose legislation through 
members of Congress. When that happens, the relevant committees may adopt 
statements from the executive branch as reflecting the bill’s purpose. In other instances, 
the bill’s journey through committees, floor debate and conference is complicated, with 
particular moments in the process being crucial to passage of the bill. 
Id. at 447 (footnotes omitted). 
 141. See id. at 439–40. 
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intentionally.142 Likewise, when the House or the Senate votes on a 
proposed rule of legislative procedure, its members share an intention 
that “we” adopt the rule if sufficiently many members vote in favor. 
Less clear is whether Congress, qua “it,” sometimes enacts a bill for 
some purpose or intends that a textual provision have some specific 
meaning. This Part suggests that Congress rarely if ever acts with such 
intentions. 
Again, on the account of shared agency just discussed, to say that 
Congress intends to φ is just to say that its members share an intention 
that “we” φ. As that account suggests, this intention can come about in 
one of two ways. First, members can share a direct intention that “we” 
φ. Second, members can share a direct intention that “we” θ that 
commits them indirectly to an intention that “we” φ. 
Consider the recent dispute in King v. Burwell143 over the phrase 
“Exchange established by the State” as used in § 36B of the Internal 
Revenue Code (IRC), which was enacted as part of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA).144 Opponents of the ACA 
argued that “Exchange established by the State” could only be read to 
refer to healthcare exchanges established by one of the fifty states or 
the District of Columbia.145 In response, the government argued that 
“the ACA’s structure and purpose all evince[d] Congress’s intent” that 
the phrase refer to “both state-run and federally-facilitated 
Exchanges.”146 Per the above, for the government’s claim to have been 
true, one of two conditions would also have had to obtain: (1) when 
enacting the ACA, members of Congress shared a direct intention that, 
by “Exchange established by the State,” “we” meant exchanges 
established by the states or the federal government; or (2) members 
shared some other direct intention, like an intention that the ACA be 
interpreted in a manner consistent with the assumptions underlying the 
 
 142. Put another way, casting one’s vote without this intention would evince a basic 
misunderstanding of voting procedure. 
 143. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
 144. I.R.C. § 36B (2012). 
 145. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488. 
 146. Brief for the Appellees at 13, King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 2014) (No. 14–1158) 
(quoting Halbig v. Sebelius, 27 F. Supp. 3d 1, 23 (D.D.C. 2014), rev’d, 758 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 
2014), reh’g en banc granted, judgment vacated, No. 14-5018, 2014 WL 4627181 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 4, 
2014)). 
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corresponding CBO score,147 that committed them indirectly to this 
reading.148 
Appeal to direct intention is, as a rule, hopeless for purposes of 
substantiating an attribution of legislative intent. As an empirical 
matter, members of Congress “don’t read text,”149 let alone form 
communicative intentions as to specific textual provisions. Further, 
because members act at the behest of different constituencies, it is rare 
for members to agree150 upon reasons for action outside of statutes’ 
preambles.151 
This leaves appeal to indirect commitment. The various scholars 
who have pursued this approach in recent years are largely those who 
have urged courts to pay greater attention to “how Congress really 
works” when engaging in statutory interpretation.152 Such scholars 
appeal to indirect commitments of one of two sorts. The first is a 
commitment resulting from members’ acceptance of formal norms. 
The second is a commitment resulting from members’ adherence to 
informal norms.  
As explained below, both approaches to indirect commitment fail. 
Although appealing to formal norms is a plausible strategy for 
attributing intentions to Congress, the intentions one can attribute on 
that basis are exceedingly few. Appealing to informal norms, by 
contrast, promises to ground a whole array of intent attributions, but 
these types of norms either do not exist or are, by their secretive nature, 
inconsistent with fair notice. 
1. Formal Norms.  On occasion, Congress plausibly commits itself 
indirectly to a communicative intention by adopting some formal norm 
such as an enacted procedural rule. For example, as Professor Victoria 
Nourse observes, both the House and the Senate have a rule that 
prohibits conference committees from altering the text of a bill when 
 
 147. See Bressman & Gluck, Part II, supra note 19, at 782. 
 148. For a discussion of how a court would go about resolving the dispute in King absent an 
appeal to actual, historical legislative intent, see infra notes 258–69 and accompanying text. 
 149. Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 14, at 972. 
 150. That is, to coordinate. 
 151. See infra notes 164–69 and accompanying text. 
 152. Nourse, supra note 1, at 143; accord KATZMANN, supra note 8, at 8 (“[S]cant 
consideration [has been] given to what I think is critical for courts discharging their interpretive 
task—an appreciation of Congress actually functions, how Congress signals its meaning, and what 
Congress expects of those interpreting its laws.”); Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 14, at 909 
(“[W]ithout a link to congressional practice, it becomes clear that [interpretive] canons allow 
judges to shape statutes in ways that may diverge from congressional expectations . . . .”). 
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the two chambers have agreed to the same language.153 From this 
procedural rule, Nourse rightly infers that, when postconference 
language differs from agreed upon preconference language, Congress 
is committed—where plausible154—to the intention that the former 
communicate something substantially similar to that which was 
communicated by the latter.155 This commitment to preconference or 
postconference consistency entails a commitment to a discernable 
communicative intention if the intention expressed by preconference 
language is itself discernable—for example, when one can tell what 
Congress meant, or at least did not mean,156 with that language.157 
Although Nourse suggests that attention to the formal norms of 
legislative procedure renders both unmysterious and unproblematic 
the search for legislative intent,158 none of Nourse’s other examples 
support that generalization. Nourse argues that various procedural 
rules dictate which stages of the legislative process are “important 
point[s] of textual decision.”159 From this “importan[ce],” Nourse infers 
that the legislative history most proximate to some such decision will 
shed the most light on legislative intent as it pertains to that decision.160 
Legislative history, however, consists only of nonbinding statements or 
 
 153. See Nourse, supra note 1, at 94 & n.97 (“Conference committees cannot—repeat, 
cannot—change the text of a bill where both houses have agreed to the same language.” 
(emphasis omitted) (citing Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R. Doc. No. 111-157, R. 
XXII (9), at 37 (2011); Standing Rules of the Senate, S. Doc. No. 112-1, R. XXVIII (2a), at 52 
(2011))). 
 154. In cases where the rule was plainly violated, one cannot plausibly attribute to Congress 
such an intention. 
 155. See Nourse, supra note 1, at 96 (“A faithful member of Congress would assume that, 
when both houses pass the same language, any added language must be read as making no 
substantive change in the bill.”). 
 156. If preconference language plainly precluded a particular reading, one could infer that 
Congress did not intend that reading post conference. This would be true regardless of whether 
preconference language was in some other way unclear. 
 157. See Nourse, supra note 1, at 96 (“If the ambiguity is created in conference committee, . . . 
then the court may resolve the ambiguity by conforming to Congress’s own rules.” (emphasis 
added) (footnote omitted)). 
 158. See id. at 72. 
 159. Id. at 98. Here, Nourse builds upon prior work in positive political science. See 
McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 57 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 3 (1994) (purporting to “identify aspects of the legislative history 
that are more reliably informative about the intent of the majority coalition that enacted a 
statute” through the identification of “veto gates”); McNollgast, supra note 91, at 720 (“The single 
most important feature of the legislative process is that, to succeed, a bill must survive a gauntlet 
of veto gates in both the House and Senate . . . .”). 
 160. See Nourse, supra note 1, at 110 (“[T]he best legislative history is the history most 
proximate to text, rather than a particular type of report or statement . . . .”). 
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reports prepared by some individual member or subset of members. By 
assuming uncritically that legislative history is probative of legislative 
intent, Nourse shifts without remark from intent qua shared indirect 
commitment to intent qua what was likely in the head of a member at 
the time of decision to the extent she was paying attention.161 There is, 
of course, no guarantee—and strong reason to doubt—that all or a 
majority of members are paying attention to any given decision at any 
given time.162 Absent some novel and unmentioned shared informal 
commitment to treating as authoritative the view of some individual 
member or set of members, Nourse offers no reason to share her 
confidence that attention to cloture rules will reveal shared intentions. 
Each of Nourse’s additional arguments suffers from this defect.163 
Congress also commits itself to communicative intentions via 
statute. The Dictionary Act, for example, contains various rules of 
construction that inform “the meaning of any Act of Congress.”164 
Because Congress has committed itself to these rules, one can attribute 
to it, all other things being equal,165 the intention to refer to “the future 
as well as the present” when it uses the present tense.166 So too, when 
Congress uses the term “person,” one can attribute to Congress the 
intention to refer to things that “include corporations, companies, 
associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, 
as well as individuals.”167  
In addition to its use of the Dictionary Act, Congress makes use 
of definitions sections within specific statutes. Hence, when 
interpreting Title 18, one can attribute to Congress, where it uses the 
term “United States” in a “territorial sense,” the intention to refer to 
“all places and waters, continental or insular, subject to the jurisdiction 
of the United States, except the Canal Zone,” as it is defined for that 
title.168 Last, Congress sometimes commits itself to broader practical 
intentions via preamble. When interpreting some provision of the 
 
 161. To the extent that committee reports and other legislative history are nonbinding, such 
sources are, at best, probative of how a given member understood the corresponding text as a 
historical matter. 
 162. See supra notes 149–52 and accompanying text. 
 163. Nourse, supra note 1, at 118–19 (claiming that statements by legislative “winners” are 
more probative than statements by “losers”). 
 164. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 165. The Dictionary Act’s rules of construction are framed as default rules, meaning that they 
are rules that apply “unless the context indicates otherwise.” Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. 18 U.S.C. § 5 (2012). 
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Animal Welfare Act, for example, one can attribute to Congress the 
intent of “[e]nsur[ing] that animals intended for use in research 
facilities . . . are provided humane care and treatment.”169 
Unfortunately, definitions sections170 and preambles only get one 
so far. Setting aside the problem that definitions sections and 
preambles themselves require interpretation,171 such provisions plainly 
do not—and could not plausibly—ground the array of intent 
attributions described in Part I.  
In sum, appealing to formal norms adopted by Congress fails as a 
general method for substantiating attributions of legislative intent. 
2. Informal Norms.  Appealing to informal legislative norms fares 
no better as a method for indirectly attributing legislative intent to 
Congress. First, recent empirical studies of the legislative drafting 
process support skepticism about the ability to attribute intent to 
Congress via informal norms. Second, judicial recognition of 
nonobvious legislative norms, such as informal norms alleged by those 
urging greater attention by interpreters to legislative process, plausibly 
conflicts with fair notice.  
What is an informal legislative norm?172 Consider the norm in 
soccer that a player kicks the ball out of bounds if a player from the 
opposing team is injured. This norm appears nowhere in the FIFA 
rulebook but is widely recognized by both players and fans. It is, 
therefore, an informal norm of the sport.173 An informal legislative 
norm is just a norm recognized but not formally adopted by Congress. 
 
 169. 7 U.S.C. § 2131 (2012). 
 170. In effect, the Dictionary Act is a definitions section for the entire U.S. Code. 
 171. Cf. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 217 (G.E.M. 
Anscombe trans., Blackwell Publishers 2d ed. 1997) (1953). Wittgenstein states: 
  “How am I able to obey a rule?”—if this is not a question about causes, then it is 
about the justification for my following the rule in the way I do. 
  If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is 
turned. Then I am inclined to say: “This is simply what I do.” 
Id.; cf. Fallon, supra note 75, at 711 (observing that “if a theory . . . tried to incorporate within 
itself rules for its own application, then someone could always demand to see the principles 
specifying how those prescriptions should in turn be interpreted”). 
 172. Cf. Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 
1181 (2013) (contrasting informal “conventions” with “formal legal rules”). 
 173. See, e.g., Nate Scott, Italian Soccer Game Has Heartwarming Display of Sportsmanship, 
USA TODAY: SPORTS (Mar. 20, 2014), http://ftw.usatoday.com/2014/03/soccer-game-italian-
serie-d-sportmanship [https://perma.cc/4AEU-W8KT] (“A player for [Team A] was injured, so 
[Team B] kicked the ball out of bounds to allow him to get treatment. As is customary in soccer, 
[Team A] then threw the ball in and gave the ball back to [Team B]’s goalkeeper.”). 
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The norm that a home-state senator retains veto power over a judicial 
nominee, for example, has no basis in statute or formal procedural rule. 
It is nonetheless recognized by members as binding.174 
Various accounts of legislative intent are built upon appealing to 
informal legislative norms. Some accounts claim that members of 
Congress share intentions to delegate the task of authoring legislation. 
In turn, members are alleged to have committed, albeit informally, to 
recognizing the intentions of their delegates as authoritative for the 
group. Solan, for example, claims that Congress delegates to 
“subplanners” the task of giving “content” to particular bills.175 Often 
the subplanners in question are originating congressional 
committees.176 According to Solan, members of Congress share a 
“general recognition that those who ushered [a] bill through the process 
did so with particular [intentions] that deserve to be honored.”177 From 
this general recognition, Solan infers that “the historical record of a 
committee . . . that developed the details of a statute is typically useful 
evidence of that subgroup’s, and thus the entire group’s, intent.”178  
Similarly, Judge Katzmann reasons that courts should consider 
legislative history because it “can aid the judge in understanding how 
the legislation’s congressional proponents wanted the statute to work, 
what problems they sought to address, what purposes they sought to 
achieve, and what methods they employed to secure those purposes.”179 
As he writes, “When Congress passes a law, it can be said to 
incorporate the materials that it or at least the law’s principal sponsors 
(and others who worked to secure enactment) deem useful in 
interpreting the law.”180 Judge Katzmann infers the informal 
commitment to incorporation from the “substantial control” over the 
legislative process afforded to “particular legislators,” including 
“committee chairs, floor managers, and party leaders.”181 Gluck and 
Bressman likewise argue that “faithful-agent judges” should use 
 
 174. See MITCHEL A. SOLLENBERGER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32013, THE HISTORY 
OF THE BLUE SLIP IN THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 1917–PRESENT at 24–
25(2003). 
 175. Solan, supra note 139, at 448–49. 
 176. See id. at 447. 
 177. Id. (emphasis added). 
 178. Id. (emphasis added). 
 179. KATZMANN, supra note 8, at 35 (emphasis added). 
 180. Id. at 48; see also id. at 38 (characterizing committee reports and conference committee 
reports as “authoritative materials”). 
 181. Id. at 48–49. 
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legislative history to discern the intentions of “legislative drafters,” 
those members and staffers most responsible for drafting a particular 
bill.182 They advocate for various interpretive rules183 that are assumed 
to approximate the intentions of those “doing the drafting,”184 
equating, without argument, the intentions of drafters with those of 
Congress as such. 
The above accounts give rise to two concerns.185 First, greater 
attention to “how Congress really works” supports skepticism about 
legislative intent via delegation. Assume that Congress intends to 
delegate authorship to “drafters.” In the simple case, a committee 
drafts a bill. Both chambers then adopt that bill without amendment. 
Here, whatever intentions are attributable to the committee are 
attributable to Congress as such. But how is one to determine what 
intentions are attributable to the committee? Beyond looking at the 
 
 182. See, e.g., Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 14, at 959. 
 183. For example, that statutes should be interpreted in accordance with the assumptions 
underlying the corresponding CBO score, and that statutes drafted by a committee should be 
construed to preserve that committee’s jurisdiction. See Bressman & Gluck, Part II, supra note 
19, at 781–82. 
 184. Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 14, at 946–47. Gluck and Bressman also argue: 
Courts rather easily might implement many of our respondents’ insights related to the 
different types of legislative history, for example: distinguish between omnibus and 
appropriations legislative history; entrench the inconsistently applied doctrine that 
committee reports are the most reliable history; pay more attention to markups; and 
place more weight on scripted colloquies or other documents issued jointly by 
committee leaders of opposing parties. 
Id. at 989. 
 185. In addition to the concerns voiced here, delegation-based accounts of legislative intent 
have been subject to nondelegation critique. Article I, Section 1 vests all legislative power in 
Congress as such. See supra notes 84–89 and accompanying text. According to Justice Scalia, “It 
has always been assumed that these powers are nondelegable—or, as John Locke put it, that 
legislative power consists of the power ‘to make laws, . . . not to make legislators.’” Bank One 
Chi. N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Tr. Co., 516 U.S. 264, 280 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting 
JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 87 (R. Cox ed., 1982) (1690)). Sharpening 
the critique, Manning argues that “legislative self-delegation poses a particularly acute danger to 
[the Article I, Section 7 requirements of] bicameralism and presentment and is unconstitutional 
per se.” John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 676 
(1997) (emphasis added). Manning reasons that when a court “gives authoritative weight to,” say, 
“a committee’s subjective understanding of statutory meaning (announced outside the statutory 
text), it empowers Congress to specify statutory details—without the structurally-mandated cost 
of getting two Houses of Congress and the President to approve them.” Id. at 707. 
This nondelegation critique, however, rests on the premise that Congress votes on 
legislative text, not drafters’ understanding thereof. But to the extent that the “drafter’s 
understanding” is just something like speaker meaning, the contrast is difficult to sustain for the 
reasons articulated in Part I. 
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statutory text, the traditional answer is to read the committee report.186 
This answer is difficult to square, however, with survey responses 
showing differences of opinion amongst drafters as to whether such 
reports are reliable.187 So too with the concession by drafters in those 
same surveys that committee reports are used sometimes “to include 
‘something we couldn’t get in the statute’ in order ‘to make key 
stakeholders happy.’”188 Further, because the majority party drafts the 
report, “[t]his puts [it] in a position to be able to use [its] control of 
legislative history to sneak in [its] preferred interpretation even if it 
goes against the bargains that [it] made with the minority party to 
achieve passage.”189 
Consider next a more complex and realistic case. Some committee 
drafts a bill. Prior to adoption, various amendments are made on the 
floor. Whose intentions are attributable to Congress? The naive 
response is that the committee’s intentions are attributable to the 
unamended portions of the bill and that the intentions of the 
amendment authors are attributable to the portions amended.190 This 
 
 186. See Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984) (“[T]he authoritative source for 
finding the Legislature’s intent lies in the Committee Reports on the bill, which ‘represen[t] the 
considered and collective understanding of those Congressmen involved in drafting and studying 
proposed legislation.’” (quoting Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969))). 
 187. Perhaps unsurprisingly, drafters responsible for committee reports hold the reports in a 
higher regard than those who were not responsible for the drafting. Compare Gluck & Bressman, 
Part I, supra note 14, at 977–78 (reporting that most committee staffers regard committee reports 
as either “very reliable” or “reliable”), with Jarrod Shobe, Intertemporal Statutory Interpretation 
and the Evolution of Legislative Drafting, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 807, 848 (2014) (reporting that 
legislative counsel—responsible for statutory text but not legislative history—regard committee 
staffers as having difficulty articulating policy goals clearly); see also Gluck & Bressman, Part I, 
supra note 14, at 978 (recognizing the “potential bias” of committee staffers in favor of committee 
work product). 
 188. Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 14, at 973; see also Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. 
Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 
607 (2002) (“As one staffer put it: ‘[T]o maintain agreement, people often prefer to leave language 
ambiguous and put things in legislative history.’”); Cf. Shobe, supra note 187, at 870 (observing 
problems of “strategic ambiguity”). 
 189. Shobe, supra note 187, at 870. As Professor Jarrod Shobe explains, “While [the majority 
party’s] duplicity could cost them credibility, it will often not be revealed until many years later—
if at all—when the case is litigated.” Id. Gluck and Bressman anticipate this concern, emphasizing 
that committee reports and other group-produced legislative history materials “often convey 
bipartisan, multimember understandings.” See Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 14, at 978. 
For the reasons explained below, however, even in cases where a committee report reflects a 
bipartisan consensus among committee members, the question of how to integrate that consensus 
with the attitudes of noncommittee members remains. 
 190. Because the amendments occur after committee, the committee does not need to form 
intentions as to their purpose or meaning. Nor is there an apparent reason to privilege committee 
intentions formed after a bill reaches the floor. 
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response is too quick. Because a bill is read as a whole, amended 
portions shape one’s reading of unamended portions and vice versa.191 
For this reason, one must attribute a coherent set of practical and 
communicative intentions to the bill’s authors to make sense of the 
whole. But how? Committee member and amendment authors do not 
need to coordinate intentions. And how to reconcile conflicting, 
uncoordinated intentions—whether policy or communicative—is 
unclear.192 
Return now to the initial assumption that members share an 
intention to delegate. What is clear is that members share an intention 
to delegate to other members and staffers the drafting of proposed 
legislation—that is, the putting of finger to keyboard.193 Members also 
depend on other members and staff for information about what the 
proposed legislation does.194 Less clear is whether members share an 
intention to delegate to other members or staffers authorship of 
proposed legislation in the sense of an authoritative understanding of 
it. For example, in arguing against a “text-focused approach” to 
interpretation,195 Gluck and Bressman claim, “It is not uncommon to 
hear that a group of elected officials has reached a ‘deal’ before pen is 
put to paper.”196 As evidence, Gluck and Bressman cite a complaint by 
Senator Mike Lee, a Republican from Utah, that “a gun bill was being 
debated even as ‘not a single senator ha[d] been provided the 
 
 191. By analogy, suppose a studio contracts with A to write a screenplay. Dissatisfied, the 
studio then contracts with B to rewrite the ending. B’s new ending will influence the audience’s 
interpretation of early scenes despite having left those scenes unaltered. Likewise, the early 
scenes will influence the audience’s interpretation of the new ending. 
 192. Add to this difficulty the practical complication that the legislative history generated with 
respect to floor amendments is alleged to be poor. 
 193. See Shobe, supra note 187, at 826–30 (discussing the role of legislative counsel in the 
drafting of legislative language). 
 194. See, e.g., id. at 834–43 (discussing legislators’ reliance on reports prepared by the 
Congressional Research Service). 
 195. In particular, Gluck and Bressman argue against an approach to interpretation that 
considers text at a “granular” level. Bressman & Gluck, Part II, supra note 19, at 743 (“This is not 
to say that members and staff do not care about text . . . . Rather, it is to say that micro-level legal 
disputes over what is often a single word in a lengthy statute may be improperly focused . . . .”); 
see also Abbe R. Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding Congress’s Plan in 
the Era of Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62, 64 (2015) [hereinafter Gluck, 
Imperfect Statutes] (arguing that, “[w]hereas the Court’s recent statutory interpretation 
jurisprudence has been marked by a targeted focus on a few contested words, King responds by 
looking at the full picture, at Congress’s ‘plan’”). 
 196. Bressman & Gluck, Part II, supra note 19, at 740. 
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legislative language.’”197 Senator Lee’s complaint only makes sense if 
proposed legislation consists of “legislative language” as opposed to 
some extratextual “deal.” Otherwise, why wait for the language? More 
to the point, it only makes sense if he regards himself as free to 
interpret that “language” himself. Again, this attitude is of a piece with 
members making floor statements that conflict with committee reports 
and the like. 
Taken together, the above points provide ample reason for 
skepticism about intent via delegation. It is doubtful that members 
share an intention to delegate authorship, and even if Congress does 
share such an intention, the intentions of delegates are unknowable or 
unformed.  
In the above respects, there is a stark difference between the 
governance structure of Congress and that of a typical corporation. 
Various scholars reason that attributing intentions to Congress is not a 
problem because we freely attribute intentions to corporations and 
other multimember bodies.198 In the case of corporations, intent 
attribution is often unproblematic because corporations are, generally 
speaking, hierarchical organizations with clear allocations of 
decisionmaking authority. Because a corporation’s general counsel has 
decisionmaking authority with respect to the corporation’s legal 
strategy, the general counsel’s intentions with respect to legal strategy 
can be attributed to the corporation as a whole.199 In this way, the 
typical corporation is unlike Congress, where a bill’s primary sponsors 
do not appear to enjoy the sort of widely recognized delegation of 
authority as a general counsel. 
Second, judicial recognition of nonobvious informal legislative 
norms would plausibly conflict with fair notice. As a constitutional 
 
 197. Jennifer Bendery, Gun Bill Vote: Senate Overcomes GOP Filibuster Effort to Begin 
Debate, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 11, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/11/gun-bill-
vote_n_3061275.html [https://perma.cc/H5YP-RF66]. 
 198. See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 105, at 99 (“It is not conceptually difficult, however, to 
attribute a purpose to a corporate body such as Congress. Corporations, companies, 
partnerships, . . . and legislatures engage in intentional activities . . . .”); Nourse, supra note 1, at 
86 (“If lawyers find no difficulty in understanding the complexities of other collective entities, 
such as corporations or administrative agencies, one wonders why it is too difficult to understand 
Congress.”). 
 199. Delegation also explains attributions of intent to judicial opinions of multimember 
courts. See Nourse, supra note 1, at 74 (“[Lawyers] do not charge the multimember Supreme 
Court with having no ‘intent’ and, from this premise, dismiss judicial opinions as if the Court had 
made no decision.”). Because courts delegate authorship of an opinion to a particular judge or 
justice in most cases, the intentions of the authoring judge or justice are attributable to the court 
as a whole. 
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matter, “laws which regulate persons or entities must give fair notice 
of conduct that is forbidden or required.”200 This recognition of a fair-
notice requirement means, at a minimum, that information necessary 
to understanding a law must be publicly available201 and that guidance 
concerning the content of the law must not be misleading.202 As a 
normative matter, notice is required by “[e]lementary notions of 
fairness.”203 It is also “recognized as an essential element of the rule of 
law.”204 Quite plausibly, “blame and punishment presuppose that [an] 
agent had a fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing.”205 So does the rule 
of law, which ensures an “opportunity to know what the law is and to 
conform [one’s] conduct accordingly.”206 
Recognition of obvious informal norms is plainly consistent with 
fair notice. The norm that legislation must be written in English has no 
formal basis but is widely recognized by members of Congress and by 
interpreters, both professional and lay.207 Because this norm is so 
intuitive, one would be hard-pressed to say that a “person of ordinary 
 
 200. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012). 
 201. See Caleb Nelson, A Response to Professor Manning, 91 VA. L. REV. 451, 463 & n.44 
(2005) (“There is a consensus, for instance, that the people subject to a statute should have fair 
notice of the law’s requirements; that is why even intentionalists restrict themselves to publicly 
available materials when trying to discern what the enacting legislature meant.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 202. See Fox, 132 S. Ct. at 2312–14, 2318 (holding that broadcasters lacked fair notice that the 
prohibition against broadcasting “obscene, indecent, or profane language” applied to “fleeting” 
expletives, where the agency policy at the time of broadcast indicated that the prohibition applied 
only to “repeated” expletives). 
 203. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996) (“Elementary notions of fairness 
enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice . . . of the 
conduct that will subject him to punishment . . . .”). 
 204. Note, Textualism as Fair Notice, 123 HARV. L. REV. 542, 543 (2009); accord Papachristou 
v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (“Living under a rule of law entails various 
suppositions, one of which is that ‘[all persons] are entitled to be informed as to what the State 
commands or forbids.’” (quoting Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939))). 
 205. David O. Brink & Dana K. Nelkin, Fairness and the Architecture of Responsibility, in 1 
OXFORD STUDIES IN AGENCY AND RESPONSIBILITY 284, 285 (David Shoemaker ed., 2013) 
(emphasis added). 
 206. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994); accord Stephen R. Munzer, A 
Theory of Retroactive Legislation, 61 TEX. L. REV. 425, 471 (1982) (“The rule of law . . . is a 
defeasible entitlement of persons to have their behavior governed by rules publicly fixed in 
advance.”). 
 207. See Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Mother May I? Imposing Mandatory 
Prospective Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 97, 101 n.9 (2003) 
(“[T]extualists assume that . . . statutes are written in English. But no text by itself declares the 
language in which it is written. Rather, the context—English-speaking authors writing to direct 
an English-speaking audience—shows that English was the language intended.” (citations 
omitted)). 
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intelligence”208 lacks notice of its operation.209 Contrast this situation 
with the alleged norm that a statute is to be interpreted in accordance 
with the understanding of its principal sponsors. Members routinely 
make floor statements that “disavow[] the committee’s or sponsor’s 
interpretation.”210 In so doing, those members implicitly repudiate the 
alleged norm of delegating authorship in a robust sense to the principal 
sponsors of a bill. Even if one proceeded on the assumption that these 
statements are subterfuge, it would still be troubling to say that citizens 
have notice of a norm that officials deny.211 Add to this confusion the 
recent finding that a sponsor’s understanding is often informed by 
“‘inside information’ that may be unknowable to courts or litigants,”212 
and the fair-notice concern becomes greater still.213 
III.  LEGISLATIVE INTENT AS FICTION, OR THE (RELATIVE) 
IRRELEVANCE OF LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 
Part II argues that claims about legislative intent are reliably false 
if taken literally. This Part contends that such claims are, therefore, 
 
 208. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012) (“A conviction or 
punishment fails to comply with due process if the statute or regulation under which it is obtained 
‘fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited . . . .’” (quoting 
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008))); accord Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 
U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (“[B]ecause we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful 
conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to 
know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly.”). 
 209. The same can probably be said of the various “linguistic” canons that interpreting courts 
apply. See generally, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 69–139 (2012) (discussing what the authors refer to as 
“semantic” and “syntactic” canons). Because those canons are just approximations of the usage 
norms of ordinary English, the general norm that statutes be written in English plausibly entails 
more specific norms that, for example, those same statutes conform to the principle of expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius. Gluck and Bressman observe that drafters report varying degrees of 
compliance with the linguistic canons. See Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 14, at 932. But 
because such canons are best understood as rules of thumb, as opposed to rigid prescriptions, such 
varied compliance is compatible with the thesis that statutes conform to these canons generally. 
 210. Manning, supra note 185, at 721 & n.207 (collecting cases). 
 211. Cf. id. at 721 (expressing concern that, “because the Court has stated that it will treat 
committee reports and sponsor’s statements as more ‘authoritative’ than ordinary floor 
statements, individual legislators can even take to the floor and make statements disavowing the 
committee’s or sponsor’s interpretation, without precluding judicial reliance on the history 
produced by the more ‘authoritative’ legislative actors” (footnotes omitted)). 
 212. Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 14, at 985. 
 213. Cf. Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 658 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment) (“Indeed, it is not unlike the practice of Caligula, who 
reportedly ‘wrote his laws in a very small character, and hung them up upon high pillars, the more 
effectually to ensnare the people.’” (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *46)). 
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best understood as involving a useful fiction. The fiction this Part posits 
is that legislation is written by a generic author. So understood, a claim 
about legislative intent is apt if and only if one would make the claim 
about a generic author on the basis of her having written the legislation 
at issue in the context of enactment. 
A. Fictionalism 
Fictionalism about a particular discourse is the thesis that claims 
within that discourse are best understood not as aiming at literal truth 
but rather as involving a useful pretense.214 Fictionalism is often 
motivated by the concern that a discourse would suffer from a 
systematic defect if claims within it were aimed at literal truth.215 That 
concern might be metaphysical or epistemological. In the case of cops 
and robbers, the concern is metaphysical. Within the discourse, 
children appear to refer to objects that do not exist. As such, claims 
within the discourse would be systematically false if they were aimed 
at literal truth. Contrast talk of cops and robbers with children 
discussing a plan to unearth buried treasure in a backyard. Here, if 
taken literally, claims within the discourse would be systematically 
unwarranted even if true: although the yard might contain buried 
treasure, the children have no way of knowing it.216 In each case, 
appealing to pretense explains away the would-be defect.217 
Fictionalism can be hermeneutic or revolutionary.218 Hermeneutic 
fictionalism says that a discourse in fact involves a pretense.219 
 
 214. See Roth, supra note 114. 
 215. See Jason Stanley, Hermeneutic Fictionalism, in 25 MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY: 
FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE 36, 36 (Peter A. French & Howard Wettstein eds., 2001) (“On a 
fictionalist view, engaging in discourse that involves apparent reference to a realm of problematic 
entities is best viewed as engaging in a pretense.”). 
 216. See, e.g., JOHN HAWTHORNE, KNOWLEDGE AND LOTTERIES 23 (2004) (“The practice of 
assertion is constituted by the rule/requirement that one assert something only if one knows it.”); 
TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON, KNOWLEDGE AND ITS LIMITS 243 (2000) (defending the “knowledge 
rule,” i.e. the rule that “[o]ne must: assert p only if one knows p”). Although not all philosophers 
accept the knowledge norm of assertion, it is common ground that the norms of assertion relate 
to epistemic access to the proposition asserted. See, e.g., Jennifer Lackey, Norms of Assertion, 41 
NOÛS 594, 595 (2007) (defending the “reasonable to believe” norm of assertion). 
 217. In other words, fictionalism is a charitable reconstruction of an otherwise defective 
discourse. 
 218. JOHN P. BURGESS & GIDEON ROSEN, A SUBJECT WITH NO OBJECT: STRATEGIES FOR 
NOMINALISTIC INTERPRETATION OF MATHEMATICS 6 (1999) (observing this distinction). 
 219. Id. (“On what may be called the hermeneutic conception, the claim is . . . ‘[a]ll anyone 
really means—all the words really mean—is . . . .’” (emphasis omitted)). 
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Revolutionary fictionalism says that it should.220 In other words, 
hermeneutic fictionalism is a descriptive thesis and revolutionary 
fictionalism is a normative one. With cops and robbers, hermeneutic 
fictionalism is plainly true. Children do not mistake a twig for a gun 
once the game has come to an end. Contrast this scenario with a child’s 
talk about her imaginary friend. Here, it might be unclear whether the 
child regards her friend as imaginary. If not, hermeneutic fictionalism 
as to her talk is false. Revolutionary fictionalism, however, is probably 
true. The child can (and should221) continue her friendship, and, in turn, 
her talk about that friendship as a game of make-believe.  
B. Fictionalism About Legislative Intent 
Fictionalism about legislative intent maintains that claims about 
intent are best understood as involving a pretense. As advocated in this 
Article, fictionalism about intent argues that intent claims involve the 
pretense that legislation is written by some author, that is, that intent 
claims should be evaluated for truth relative to that pretense.  
As explained in Part I, intent attribution is necessary if legislation 
is to be an effective means of communication.222 For that reason, simply 
abandoning discourse about legislative intent is not a serious option. 
As explained in Part II, the primary motivation for fictionalism is the 
metaphysical concern that legislation has no author.223 If legislation has 
no author, then claims about legislative intent are systematically false 
if taken literally. Appealing to the pretense of a generic author explains 
away this defect.224 Understood as involving this pretense, a claim 
about legislative intent is apt if and only if one would make the claim 
about a generic author on the basis of her having written the legislation 
at issue in the context of enactment. 
 
 220. Id. (“On what may be called the revolutionary conception, the goal is reconstruction or 
revision.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 221. See, e.g., Paige E. Davis, Elizabeth Meins & Charles Fernyhough, Individual Differences 
in Children’s Private Speech: The Role of Imaginary Companions, 116 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD 
PSYCHOL. 561, 561 (2013) (finding that “[c]hildren who had imaginary companions were more 
likely to engage in covert private speech”). 
 222. See supra notes 23–78 and accompanying text. 
 223. A secondary motivation for fictionalism about legislative intent is the epistemological 
concern that, even if legislation has an author, its author’s intentions are unknowable. See supra 
notes 186–89 and accompanying text. If an author’s intentions are unknowable, then claims about 
legislative intent are systematically unwarranted if aimed at literal truth. See supra note 216. 
 224. Appeal to this pretense also explains away the above-mentioned epistemological defect 
because it renders legislative intent knowable by definition—that is, with a fictionalist approach, 
legislative intent simply is what one would have reason to believe it to be. 
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Why a generic author? Intent claims are made in relation to a 
context of enactment. That context consists of information from which 
one can draw inferences about an author about whom one otherwise 
knows nothing. Because one is interpreting a federal statute, for 
example, one can infer that its author has written legislation as opposed 
to satire. Likewise, one can infer that the statute’s author has written 
in English.225 More generally, the context of enactment provides 
enough information to make sense of what an author is doing. For this 
reason, appealing to the pretense of a generic author is enough to make 
sense of discourse about legislative intent. As such, appealing to the 
pretense of a “reasonable legislator” is unnecessary.226 One can thus 
avoid the political–philosophical judgments such an appeal might 
entail.227 
As conceived in this Article, fictionalism about intent is a 
refinement of “objectified intent” invoked by some textualists. 
According to Manning, “Legislative intent, to the extent textualists 
invoke it, is a framework of analysis designed to satisfy the minimum 
 
 225. See supra note 207 and accompanying text. 
 226. E.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. 
REV. 885, 895 (2003) (observing that “[p]urposivism usually attributes goals or aims by 
envisioning reasonable legislators acting reasonably”); see also HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT 
M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1378 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) 
(recommending that courts interpret statutes under the presumption that the legislature is “made 
of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes, reasonably”). 
 227. Given a minimalist gloss, the “reasonable legislator” collapses into the generic author. A 
generic author is presumptively reasonable in the sense that a listener assumes, all other things 
being equal, that a speaker has complied with the operative conversational norms. See Kent Bach, 
Speech Acts and Pragmatics, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 
147, 155 (Michael Devitt & Richard Hanley eds., 2006) (“The listener presumes that the speaker 
is being cooperative and is speaking truthfully, informatively, relevantly, perspicuously, and 
otherwise appropriately. If an utterance superficially appears not to conform to this presumption, 
the listener looks for a way of taking the utterance so that it does conform.”). Given a 
nonminimalist gloss, however, the “reasonable legislator” can diverge from the generic author in 
one of two ways. First, one can apply a stronger presumption of reasonableness to the reasonable 
legislator than one would to a run-of-the-mill interlocutor. For example, for a very strong 
presumption against misstatement, see United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 82 
(1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he sine qua non of any ‘scrivener’s error’ doctrine, it seems to 
me, is that the meaning genuinely intended but inadequately expressed must be absolutely clear; 
otherwise we might be rewriting the statute rather than correcting a technical mistake.” (emphasis 
added)); Scott Soames, Deferentialism: A Post-Originalist Theory of Legal Interpretation, 82 
FORDHAM L. REV. 597, 604 (2013) (“When ordinary speakers leave crucial contingencies 
unaddressed, when they unwittingly undertake inconsistent commitments, or when what they 
advocate transparently defeats the goals of their advocacy, we do not pretend that Beneficient 
Providence has filled every gap, removed every contradiction, and rationalized every linguistic 
performance.”). Second, one might build in to the idea a philosophically robust conception of 
“legislator” (for example, a delegate or a trustee conception). 
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conditions for meaningful communication by a multimember body 
without actual intentions to judges, administrators, and the public, who 
all form a community of shared conventions for decoding language in 
context.”228 As Manning also explains, “[T]extualists focus on 
‘objectified intent,’” that is, “the import that a reasonable person 
conversant with applicable social and linguistic conventions would 
attach to the enacted words.”229 Textualists sometimes unreasonably 
restrict context to so-called “semantic context.”230 And they sometimes 
misidentify the epistemic positions that determine what information 
context includes.231 Still, the pretense of a generic author both captures 
and renders more precise the basic textualist insight that legislative 
intent is just the intent that one would attribute to the author of 
legislation as such. 
Fictionalism is thus both similar to and different from the sort of 
minimalism about legislative intent defended by Professor Joseph Raz 
and others. Raz argues that, when a legislator votes on some text, she 
does so with the minimal—and presumably shared—intention that the 
text be read in accordance with “the [interpretive] conventions 
prevailing at the time.”232 Professor Jeremy Waldron likewise assures 
that a legislator casts her vote “on the assumption that—to put it 
crudely—what the words mean to h[er] is identical to what they will 
mean to those to whom they are addressed (in the event that the 
provision is passed).”233  
Understood in one way, such claims are uncontroversial but 
uninformative: to say that a member intends a text to be read in 
accordance with “prevailing” conventions is like saying that the 
member regards the conventions she intends as prevailing. Likewise, 
to say that a member assumes a text will mean to its audience what it 
means to her is plausibly only to say that the member believes that her 
interpretation is correct. In other words, Raz and Waldron, read one 
way, claim only that a text’s meaning is assumed by all parties to be 
objective. By contrast, understood another, more ambitious way, such 
 
 228. Manning, supra note 10, at 434. 
 229. Id. at 424. 
 230. See supra notes 78–85 and accompanying text. 
 231. See infra note 277 and accompanying text. 
 232. RAZ, supra note 7, at 286. 
 233. JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 129 (1999); see also id. (“That such 
assumptions pervade the legislative process shows how much law depends on language, on the 
shared conventions that constitute a language, and on the reciprocity of intentions that 
conventions comprise.”). 
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claims amount to an endorsement of fictionalism—or, to be more 
precise, a functional equivalent. On this understanding, to read a text 
in accordance with “prevailing” conventions is to attach to it the 
“import” that “a reasonable person conversant with applicable social 
and linguistic” norms would, or, in other words, understanding the text 
as expressing “objectified” intent.234 Producing such an intent is the 
same as intending that a text be read as if written by a generic author.235 
Professor Richard Ekins similarly argues that a reasonable 
legislator shares with her colleagues the intention that a legislative text 
have “the meaning that a reasonable sole legislator who attends to the 
context . . . would be likely to intend to convey in uttering” those 
words.236 The reason, according to Ekins, is that the “object of 
legislative deliberation,” in a well-functioning legislature, must be a 
“proposal that is transparent to legislators and the community.”237 By 
intending that the “content of the [legislative] proposal turn[] on how 
it is reasonably to be understood,” legislators ensure that “what 
interpreters say [the legislature] intended to do” is the same as “what 
was open to and thus chosen by the legislators.”238  
The “reasonable sole legislator” that Ekins posits is potentially 
more robust and, hence, more contestable than the generic author 
posited here. Ekins insists, “The sole legislator has a duty to oversee 
the content of the law and to act to change the law when this serves the 
common good.”239 Similarly, Ekins reasons that “proposals for action 
that are fit to be chosen by a reasonable sole legislator [are] coherent, 
 
 234. Manning, supra note 10, at 424. 
 235. Professor Andrei Marmor defends a similar view, arguing that legislators share an 
intention to enact as law the communicative content expressed by a legal text adopted through 
agreed-upon voting procedures. See ANDREI MARMOR, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW 17–18 (2014). 
In turn, Marmor identifies the communicative content expressed by some text as just the 
communicative intention a reader would attribute to its author on the basis of her having written 
that text in context. See id. at 21–22. According to Marmor, that legislators share the above-
identified intention is crucial because, absent that intention, the enactment of legislation fails as 
a speech act. See id. at 111–12 (insisting that legislation must be viewed as a successful collective 
speech act if one is to “take the communicative aspect of lawmaking seriously”). 
 236. RICHARD EKINS, THE NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT 236 (2012). Ekins observes 
rightly that “meaning” attribution of the sort he imagines involves attribution of both linguistic 
and practical intentions. See id. at 235–36 (“It is possible for drafters to convey more than the 
semantic content of the bill alone because legislators have good reason to understand proposals 
for action to be the choice that a rational legislator would be likely to make in enacting this text.”). 
 237. Id. at 231. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. at 128 (emphasis added). 
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reasoned plans to change the law.”240 Whether those expectations are 
more demanding than the expectations one would have of a generic 
author depends upon just how robustly one interprets, for example, 
“coherence.”241 Regardless, the “reasonable sole legislator” account 
that Ekins puts forward is functionally similar to the generic-author 
account defended here. The key difference is that Ekins purports to 
describe the way legislators actually think.  
A potential problem with using anything like a generic-author 
account as an account of actual legislator intention is that it conflicts 
with the express position of numerous actual legislators. As Judge 
Katzmann and others note, many—though not all—legislators declare 
publicly that interpreters owe special attention to committee reports, 
statements by pivotal legislators, and other legislative history.242 Such 
declarations are plainly incompatible with a generic-author account 
whereby facts about “the intentions of individual legislators” 
concerning “particular legislative acts” are, as Ekins observes, 
“irrelevant to the content of [such] act[s].”243 As Ekins concedes, a 
“well-formed legislative assembly” cannot include members who 
publicly reject that legislation should be read as if written by a 
“reasonable sole legislator.”244 Yet, by insisting publicly that the views 
of “pivotal legislators” should control, the legislators that Judge 
Katzmann and others identify do precisely that.245 Ekins might be right 
that a reasonable legislator would intend that a statute be read as if 
 
 240. Id. at 220 (emphasis added). 
 241. Cf., e.g., Doerfler, supra note 23, at 812 (arguing that Congress, like ordinary speakers, 
“occasionally misspeak[s]”). 
 242. See KATZMANN, supra note 8, at 36 (observing that members of both parties “have 
consistently supported judicial resort to legislative history”). 
 243. See EKINS, supra note 236, at 231. 
 244. See id. at 221. Ekins allows that a well-functioning legislature might admit of silent 
dissenters. See id. at 222 (claiming that “secret defection need not frustrate joint action”). 
 245. Id. at 241 (“[W]ithout some reason for other legislators to accept that the text means 
what the pivotal legislators say it means, the public statements of those legislators cannot settle 
what the assembly enacts.”). 
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written by a generic author.246 The trouble is that, as an empirical 
matter, numerous actual legislators appear unreasonable.247 
Fictionalism also shares similarities with so-called “original public 
meaning” originalism in constitutional interpretation.248 As 
characterized by Professor Lawrence Solum, “The original-meaning 
version of originalism emphasizes the meaning that the Constitution 
(or its amendments) would have had to the relevant audience at the 
time of its adoption[].”249 More precisely, original-public-meaning 
originalists inquire into the “conventional” meaning of constitutional 
language “in context” at the time of adoption and ratification.250 
Original-public-meaning originalism thus differs from so-called 
“original intention” originalism,251 which has as its object of inquiry the 
 
 246. See id. at 235–36; see also RAZ, supra note 7, at 286 (arguing that a legislator must intend 
that a legislative text be read in accordance with prevailing conventions because to intend 
otherwise would be futile and therefore irrational); cf. Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 
5 (Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Papers Series, No. 07-24, Nov. 22, 2008), http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1120244 [https://perma.cc/JV9H-QQ4E] [hereinafter Solum, Semantic Originalism] 
(arguing that “under normal conditions successful constitutional communication requires reliance 
by the drafters, ratifiers, and interpreters on the original public meaning of the words and 
phrases”). 
 247. See, e.g., KATZMANN, supra note 8, at 36–37 (quoting various members of Congress as 
recommending careful attention to legislative history). 
 248. E.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. 
L. REV. 1, 4 (2011); Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 246, at 2. 
 249. Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 246, at 51; see also Lawrence B. Solum, District 
of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 926 (2009) [hereinafter Solum, 
Heller and Originalism] (characterizing “original public meaning originalism” as “the view that 
the original meaning of a constitutional provision is the conventional semantic meaning that the 
words and phrases had at the time the provision was framed and ratified”). 
 250. Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 246, at 2. 
 251. See generally Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional 
Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226 (1988). Original-intention 
originalism “calls for judges to apply the rules . . . in the sense in which those rules were 
understood by the people who enacted them.” Id. at 230 (emphasis omitted). But it does not ask 
how “the framers would decide [a specific legal question] if they could somehow be asked.” Id. at 
236. As Professor Richard Kay explains, original-intention originalism is not to be confused with 
originalism about expected application. See Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public 
Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 703, 709–10 (2009) (characterizing 
“original intended meaning” as “the meaning that textual language had for the relevant enactors 
when they approved the text in question,” as contrasted with “the enactors’ expectations with 
respect to the particular instances that would come within the scope of the rules created”); see 
also Frederick Schauer, An Essay on Constitutional Language, 29 UCLA L. REV. 797, 806 (1982) 
(arguing that originalism about expected application is “implausible precisely because [it] 
ignore[s] the distinction between the meaning of a rule (such as a constitutional provision) and 
the instances of its application”). 
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actual, historical intentions of the enactors of the Constitution.252 Much 
like textualists,253 original-public-meaning originalists tend to 
underestimate the role of pragmatics in communication.254 For that 
reason, original-public-meaning originalists rely upon the notion of 
“conventional” meaning to a greater extent than is, perhaps, 
warranted.255 Still, much like fictionalism, original-public-meaning 
originalism focuses on the communicative intentions one would 
attribute to the authors of the Constitution,256 despite the reluctance of 
original-public-meaning originalists to talk in terms of “intent.”257 
To illustrate the fictionalist approach, consider again the dispute 
in King.258 As described above,259 the government claimed that 
“Congress intended” that the phrase “Exchange established by the 
State,” as used in Internal Revenue Code § 36B, refer to “both state- 
and federally-facilitated Exchanges.”260 How to evaluate this claim? 
Adhering to fictionalism as conceived in this Article, this claim is apt if 
and only if one would attribute to a generic author an intention to refer 
to “both state- and federally-facilitated Exchanges” on the basis of her 
having written the phrase “Exchanges established by the State” in the 
 
 252. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION 
OF THE LAW 144 (1990) (“The search is not for a subjective intention. . . . [W]hat counts is what 
the public understood.”). 
 253. See supra notes 78–85 and accompanying text. 
 254. Solum appears to regard pragmatics as limited to vagueness and ambiguity resolution. 
See Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic and Normative Originalism: Comments on Brian Leiter’s 
“Justifying Originalism,” LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Oct. 30, 2007, 1:30 AM), http://lsolum.typepad.
com/legaltheory/2007/10/semantic-and-no.html [https://perma.cc/8R6K-PTFA]. 
 255. To illustrate, Solum contrasts “conventional” meaning with “special or idiosyncratic” 
meaning based upon the “secret” intentions of authors. Solum, Heller and Originalism, supra note 
249, at 951–52. Only to the extent that Solum has in mind intentions that are “special or 
idiosyncratic” given the practical context is the contrast tenable. See supra notes 34–59 and 
accompanying text. 
 256. Whether the same sorts of arguments against shared intentions in Congress raised in Part 
II apply to the Framers goes beyond the scope of this Article. There are, however, obvious 
disanalogies between the two settings. For example, it is far more likely that the Framers paid 
careful attention to constitutional text. Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 14, at 972–73 
(“Members [of Congress] don’t read text. . . . [T]hey all just read summaries.”). 
 257. Professor Steven Calabresi and attorney Julia Rickert use the phrase “objective social 
meaning.” Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 248, at 8. This general reluctance to talk of “intent” 
suggests that at least some original-public-meaning originalists regard intent as a dispensable 
metaphor. For citations to authors who describe intent as a “heuristic” and a “metaphor,” see 
supra note 1. 
 258. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2490 (2015). 
 259. See supra notes 143–47 and accompanying text. 
 260. King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 369, 370 (4th Cir. 2014), aff’d, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
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context of enactment. So understood, whether the government’s claim 
is apt plausibly depends on what counts as the “context of enactment.” 
If context is limited to the operative and immediately surrounding 
statutory provisions, the government’s claim appears somewhat 
implausible: § 36B refers to “Exchange[s] established by the State 
under section 1311 of the [ACA]”261 and § 1311, in turn, encourages but 
does not require a state to “establish” an exchange.262 Furthermore,  
§ 1321 creates a backstop, directing the federal government, through 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services, to “establish and operate 
such Exchange within [a] State” if that state opts not to establish an 
exchange under section 1311.263 Considering this explicit contrast 
between state and federal exchanges, one would likely take the author 
of § 36B to mean state by “state.” 
If, on the other hand, the context includes the ACA in its entirety, 
the government’s position seems much more plausible. For one, 
consideration of the whole statute suggests that the narrow reading of 
§ 36B would give rise to various anomalies throughout the ACA. 
Among other things, the ACA would require the creation of federally 
facilitated exchanges on which there would be no “qualified 
individuals” eligible to shop,264 as well as the reporting of information 
for a reconciliation of tax credits that could never occur.265 
The government’s position appears even more plausible if the 
contextual backdrop is expanded further still to include public 
discussion of the ACA and its structure as a “three-legged stool.”266 
The proposed healthcare reform was characterized repeatedly as 
having three basic elements: 
  First, people will be required to buy insurance, to spread costs 
among the sick and the healthy. Second, insurers will be prohibited 
from cherry-picking only the healthiest customers, again to spread 
 
 261. I.R.C. § 36B (2012). 
 262. 42 U.S.C. § 18031 (2012). 
 263. Id. § 18041. 
 264. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2490 (2015) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 18031(d)(2)(A), 
18032(f)(1)(A)). 
 265. Id. at 2492. 
 266. Jonathan Gruber, Health Care Reform Is a “Three-Legged Stool”: The Costs of Partially 
Repealing the Affordable Care Act, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 2 (Aug. 2010), http://
cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2010/08/pdf/repealing_reform.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2WS5-D5Q7]. 
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costs. Finally, the government will give subsidies to people, like 
McDonald’s workers, who can’t afford insurance on their own.267 
It was emphasized that all three “legs” were necessary for the stool to 
stand. Against this backdrop, one would likely attribute to the author 
of § 36B the intention to refer to both state and federal exchanges. One 
would, in turn, understand her use of the phrase “Exchange established 
by the State” as a simple misstatement or a scrivener’s error.268  
Part III.C next explains how to determine what information 
should be considered as context. As a preview, the broader 
understanding of context would probably have been appropriate in 
King.269 This Article need not take a position on whether fictionalism 
about legislative intent is hermeneutic or revolutionary.270 At least 
some jurists are plausibly fictionalists.271 Others, however, are plainly 
 
 267. David Leonhardt, Health Care’s Uneven Road to a New Era, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2010), 
www.nytimes.com/2010/10/06/business/economy/06leonhardt.html [https://perma.cc/AQ4A-W6
RB]. 
 268. Doerfler, supra note 23, at 814; Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, supra note 195, at 64. As both 
of the cited articles suggest, so long as “context” includes the text of the ACA as a whole, the 
scrivener’s-error reading is probably—though not certainly—the best one. 
 269. Adopting a broader understanding of context, King interestingly diverged from the 
previous ACA case, National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 
2566 (2012). In NFIB, the Court considered a constitutional challenge to Congress’s authority to 
impose an individual insurance mandate as part of the ACA. Id. at 2577. Famously, the Court 
rejected the government’s argument that Congress was authorized to impose such a mandate 
under the Commerce Clause, but nonetheless upheld the mandate as a legitimate exercise of 
Congress’s taxing power. Id. at 2608. The Court’s classification of the mandate as a “tax,” as 
opposed to a “penalty,” for constitutional purposes was striking both because the ACA itself 
referred to the mandate as a “penalty,” see id. at 2582–83, and, as relevant here, because the 
political actors involved in the ACA’s enactment emphasized to the public repeatedly  
that the mandate was not a “tax.” See, e.g., Obama: Health Mandate Not a Tax Increase, CBS 
NEWS (Sept. 20, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/obama-health-mandate-not-a-tax-increase 
[https://perma.cc/X2AA-RUU5]. As the Court insisted quite plausibly, whether something is a 
“tax” for constitutional (as opposed to statutory) purposes depends much more on how it 
functions than on how it is labeled. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2582–84, 2594–600. Considering the 
broader context, it does seem that the Court in NFIB should have strained to understand the 
mandate as functioning as a penalty as opposed to a tax, constitutional avoidance concerns 
notwithstanding. See Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The Modern 
Supreme Court and Legal Change, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2109, 2137–49 (2015). 
 270. In other words, this Article does not need to take a position on whether fictionalism 
about legislative intent is an error theory. Cf. J.L. MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND 
WRONG 35, 48–49 (1977) (defending an error theory about moral discourse). The only “error” to 
which this Article is committed is that of members of Congress, to the extent that members regard 
their individual intentions as attributable to Congress as such. But see supra notes 234–35 and 
accompanying text (considering the possibility that members share an intention that statutes be 
read as if written by a generic author). 
 271. See, e.g., United States v. Mitra, 405 F.3d 492, 495 (7th Cir. 2005) (Easterbrook, J.) 
(“Congress is a ‘they’ and not an ‘it’; a committee lacks a brain (or, rather, has so many brains 
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not.272 What matters for present purposes is that fictionalism is the best 
way to rationalize discourse about legislative intent. Whether some 
jurists are already fictionalists is a secondary concern. 
C. The Context of Enactment and Legislative Process 
Context is the “mutually salient information” that an author 
exploits to make evident to her audience what she means.273 Put 
another way, context is the information of which an author can 
reasonably expect her audience to be aware. Thus, to determine the 
context of enactment for some statute, one must determine that 
statute’s audience. 
Conversely, because context is cognitive “common ground,”274 
there is no reason to privilege the epistemic position of an author over 
that of her audience. Suppose, for example, that certain information (a 
wedding anniversary) is of much higher salience to an author (a law 
professor) than to her audience (her students). Here, it would be 
unreasonable for that author to try to exploit that information to make 
her intentions known (a take-home exam prompt indicating that the 
exam is due on “the special day” at 5 PM). Because her audience would 
predictably fail to call that information to mind, such a communicative 
attempt by the author would predictably fail in turn. 
Despite the above, much prior scholarship privileges the epistemic 
position of members of Congress when considering what information 
the context of enactment includes.275 Adherence to this 
“eavesdropping” model is plainest in scholarship that urges greater 
attention to the legislative process.276 Even those who oppose 
 
with so many different objectives that it is almost facetious to impute a joint goal or purpose to 
the collectivity).”); see also id. (“Legislation is an objective text approved in constitutionally 
prescribed ways; its scope is not limited by the cerebrations of those who voted for or signed it 
into law.”); Scalia, supra note 10, at 17 (“Government by unexpressed intent is simply 
tyrannical.”). 
 272. See e.g., Auburn Hous. Auth. v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 138, 143–44 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(Katzmann, J.) (“If the meaning of the statute is ambiguous, the court may resort to canons of 
statutory interpretation to help resolve the ambiguity. The court may also look at legislative 
history to determine the intent of Congress.” (citations omitted)). 
 273. Bach, Content ex Machina, supra note 12, at 19. 
 274. Robert Stalnaker, Indicative Conditionals, in CONTEXT AND CONTENT: ESSAYS ON 
INTENTIONALITY IN SPEECH AND THOUGHT 63, 67 (1999). 
 275. See supra notes 11–21 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Andrei Marmor, The 
Pragmatics of Legal Language, 21 RATIO JURIS 423, 434 (2008) (“Judges and litigants are not 
parties to the legislative conversation, so to speak, and they have to rely on secondary sources to 
gather the relevant information.”). 
 276. See supra notes 16–21 and accompanying text. 
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consideration of extratextual sources such as legislative history, 
however, tend to accept the basic eavesdropping framework. Justice 
Scalia, for instance, characterized the role of an interpreter as 
“read[ing] the words of [a] text as any ordinary Member of Congress 
would have read them, and apply[ing] the meaning so determined.” 277 
As an alternative, this Article puts forward the “conversation” 
model of interpretation. Under this model, legislation is treated as 
having been written by legislators for those who administer the law (for 
example, courts and agencies) and for those on whom the law operates 
(for example, citizens). So understood, legislative text is to be read in 
light of information salient to legislators and citizens alike. For a given 
statute, the audience is, of course, diverse.278 Nonetheless, because 
context consists of mutually salient information, one can start by 
identifying the least informed segment of the audience. When a statute 
operates on citizens, the context of enactment is limited to information 
of which citizens should be aware.279 So much is required for a statute 
to have an accessible meaning that is constant across that statute’s 
audience.280 
 
 277. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 405 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) 
(citation omitted). 
 278. See Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 
549, 576 (1985) (observing that, in addition to the administering agency, “most regulatory statutes’ 
audiences also include private parties whose conduct or status is subject to regulation by the 
administering agency”); Victoria Nourse, Misunderstanding Congress: Statutory Interpretation, 
the Supermajoritarian Difficulty, and the Separation of Powers, 99 GEO. L.J. 1119, 1127 (2011) 
(“[S]tatutes are directed to multiple audiences, including courts and agencies.”). 
 279. By contrast, when a statute operates only upon sophisticated parties, the information 
that could plausibly be included in the context of enactment is much greater. See Meir Dan-
Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. 
L. REV. 625, 625 (1984) (exploring the “idea that a distinction can be drawn in the law between 
rules addressed to the general public and rules addressed to officials”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 355 n.124 (1990) (“Highly 
technical statutes should not be read with the ‘common sense’ of the average person, but rather 
with the ‘common sense’ of the special audience to which the statute is addressed (such as gas and 
oil companies or tax lawyers).”). When a statute operates specifically upon financial institutions, 
an author can reasonably expect awareness of technical concepts in a way that she could not with 
respect to a general-conduct statute. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1)(A) (2012) (prohibiting a 
“banking entity” from engaging in “proprietary trading”). The regulation of sophisticated parties 
in particular is thus one means by which Congress can regulate subject matter that an ordinary 
citizen could not be expected reasonably to understand. 
 280. The legislative context differs from conversational contexts in which a speaker intends 
to communicate different things to different audience members. Suppose that A and B are 
planning a surprise birthday party for C. In that context, A might say to B, “I am looking forward 
to a quiet night in,” intending to communicate to B that the party is still on but to C that she is 
looking forward to a calm evening. For a partial dissent arguing that the same law can function 
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The conversation model of interpretation does not by itself dictate 
which sources of information an interpreter should consider in a 
particular case. Context consists of the information of which both 
speaker and audience should be aware. The model leaves open, 
however, just how large a set of informational sources to which citizens 
are expected to be attentive in any given case. By deemphasizing the 
epistemic position of legislators, the model alters the set of plausible 
answers to such questions. To see how, go back to legislative history. 
Different considerations speak for and against holding an audience 
accountable for nontextual, historical informational sources—such as 
legislative history—in different cases.281 That said, it is hard to imagine 
a case in which it would be reasonable to hold an audience accountable 
for legislative history to the exclusion of other nontextual sources, like 
newspaper articles or television reports. Especially so if the case 
involves a law that operates upon citizens. With the ACA, can one 
seriously argue that a Senate Finance Committee report is of higher 
mutual salience than contemporaneous evening news reports featuring 
officials and experts discussing the proposed law? Or, for that matter, 
cotemporaneous front-page reporting from The New York Times or 
The Wall Street Journal?  
In the conversation model, legislative history is just one 
nontextual, historical source among many. In response, one might 
object that popular sources are inherently less reliable than legislative 
history in its various forms. Public statements by officials are, after all, 
as much marketing as information conveyance, and news reports are 
produced by corporate entities with their own material and ideological 
interests. To this, there are various responses. First, like public 
statements, legislative history is often as much about marketing as 
anything else.282 Second, both public statements and news reports are 
much more accessible to nongovernmental actors than legislative 
history. So those sources are, for better or for worse, ones upon which 
time- and resource-constrained individuals will predictably rely. If 
popular sources of information about legislation are unreliable, that is 
a serious problem for a democracy. But it is hard to see how any 
judicial-interpretive rule would render that problem any less serious. 
 
both as a “conduct” rule directed at citizens and as a “decision” rule directed at officials, see 
generally Dan-Cohen, supra note 279. 
 281. See infra notes 309–32 and accompanying text. 
 282. See Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 14, at 973 (reporting that legislative history is 
used to include “‘something [legislators] couldn’t get in the statute’ in order ‘to make key 
stakeholders happy’” (quoting a congressional counsel survey respondent)). 
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Even less plausible than treating legislative history as special is the 
suggestion that an interpreter should sort carefully among different 
kinds of legislative history. Gluck and Bressman, for example, urge 
courts “to separate the useful from the misleading,” reasoning that 
attention to the legislative process reveals some kinds of legislative 
history as more “reliable” than others.283 Gluck and Bressman base 
their comparative reliability assessments on the views of congressional 
staffers. Given this evidence, it is entirely plausible that committee 
reports are of much higher salience than floor statements to staffers.284 
Conceivably the same is true of agencies, given their “multilevel and 
ongoing relationship with Congress.”285 And perhaps the same is 
(somewhat) true of courts, given their (uneven) history of privileging 
committee reports over other legislative historical sources.286 Add 
ordinary citizens to the conversational mix, however, and any 
difference in mutual salience between committee reports and floor 
statements quickly becomes de minimis. If judicial understanding of 
the legislative process is considered lacking,287 popular understanding 
is woeful. Further, as explained in Part II, committee reports and the 
like have no claim to authority.288 It is thus hard to see why citizens 
would have an obligation to be privy to such distinctions.289 
Privileging the epistemic position of members of Congress can 
suggest textual clarity when there is none. In Zuber v. Allen,290 for 
example, the Supreme Court invalidated a U.S. Department of 
 
 283. Id. at 977, 989. 
 284. See id. 
 285. Kevin M. Stack, Purposivism in the Executive Branch: How Agencies Interpret Statutes, 
109 NW. U. L. REV. 871, 884 (2015) (observing that this relationship allows agencies “firsthand 
knowledge of the critical debates and the character of their resolution,” making them “more 
reliable readers of legislative history”); see also Bressman & Gluck, Part II, supra note 19, at 767 
(noting that “drafters saw their primary interpretive relationship as one with agencies”). 
 286. See Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984) (“In surveying legislative history we 
have repeatedly stated that the authoritative source for finding the Legislature’s intent lies in the 
Committee Reports on the bill . . . .”). But see infra notes 290–98 and accompanying text. 
 287. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 288. Nourse argues that, owed to ignorance of the legislative process, interpreters routinely 
confuse the legislative history equivalents of “majority” and “dissenting” opinions. Nourse, supra 
note 1, at 73. As explained in Part II, Nourse is wrong to regard these alleged “majority opinions” 
(for example, statements by a bill’s primary sponsors) as “authoritative statements of meaning.” 
Id. 
 289. Any hierarchy of legislative history thus differs from statutory text or prior judicial 
decisions, both of which are formally binding on citizens and therefore more plausibly generate a 
duty of inquiry. 
 290. Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168 (1969). 
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Agriculture order requiring milk distributors within the Boston 
marketing area to pay premium prices to “nearby” milk producers.291 
The Court held that this “nearby” differential was inconsistent with a 
federal statute requiring that orders regulating the handling of milk 
provide for uniform prices to all producers within a given marketing 
area, subject to specific exceptions.292 The Court rejected the 
government’s argument that the “nearby” differential fit within the 
exception for “market . . . differentials customarily applied” by 
distributors, appealing to the accompanying House Report.293  
In dissent, Justice Black contended that the broader legislative 
history, in particular a colloquy on the Senate floor, “ma[de] it clear 
beyond any doubt that this provision was designed to allow the 
Secretary broad leeway in regulating the milk industry.”294 This 
provision included leeway to preserve price advantages enjoyed by 
farmers near Boston prior to federal regulation.295 The majority 
insisted that its “conclusions [were] in no way undermined by the 
colloquy on the floor,” reasoning that while “[a] committee report 
represents the considered and collective understanding of those 
Congressmen involved in drafting and studying proposed legislation,” 
“[f]loor debates reflect at best the understanding of individual 
Congressmen.”296 
What the exchange between the majority and dissent in Zuber 
suggests is that the statute was simply “silent or ambiguous with respect 
to the specific issue” before the Court.297 Read in isolation, the 
 
 291. Id. at 170–71. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. at 181. 
 294. Id. at 202–03 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. at 186 (majority opinion). But see Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 14, at 986 
(finding that drafters regard “‘staged’ colloquies between the chair and ranking member of the 
committee as reliably indicating the common understanding on both sides”). 
 297. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). Although 
Zuber is a pre-Chevron case, courts continue to consult legislative history when determining 
whether an agency interpretation is “reasonable” and therefore authoritative under Chevron. See 
id. at 844 (“[A] court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provison [sic] for a 
reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.”). Although courts disagree 
about whether it is appropriate to consult legislative history at step one or step two of the Chevron 
analysis, that distinction is likely irrelevant. Compare Halverson v. Slater, 129 F.3d 180, 184 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997) (holding that “the lower court erred by failing to ‘exhaust the traditional tools of 
statutory construction,’” including consultation of legislative history, at Chevron step one 
(quoting Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Browner, 57 F.3d 1122, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1995))), with 
Cohen v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 498 F.3d 111, 122 (2d Cir. 2007). The court in Cohen noted: 
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language at issue admits of a broad or narrow reading. The same is true 
after taking into account information contained in available nontextual 
historical sources. The majority created an illusion of clarity by 
distinguishing “good” legislative history from “bad.” But the reality is 
that the text, read against the backdrop of conflicting legislative 
history, was unclear as to whether “market . . . differentials” included 
differentials that were “economically [un]sound.”298  
In addition to legislative history, the conversation model also calls 
into question whether courts should pay special attention to customary 
legal usage. In Morissette v. United States,299 Justice Jackson famously 
remarked: 
[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the 
legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably 
knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each 
borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and 
the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise 
instructed.300 
Justice Jackson appeared to understand legislation as communication 
between members of Congress and courts, which is to say 
communication between lawyers.301  
 
  This court has generally been reluctant to employ legislative history at step one of 
Chevron analysis, mindful that the “interpretive clues” to be found in such history will 
rarely speak with sufficient clarity to permit us to conclude “beyond reasonable doubt” 
that Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. 
Id. (quoting Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 586, 590 (2004) (citation 
omitted)); see also Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 
VA. L. REV. 597, 602 (2009) (“[N]othing of consequence turns on whether the set of permissible 
interpretations has one element or more than one element; the only question is whether the 
agency’s interpretation is in that set or not.”). Courts likewise continue to privilege some kinds of 
legislative history over others, both in the administrative law context and elsewhere. See, e.g., 
Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court, 435 F.3d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 2006). The court in Kenna explained: 
  Floor statements are not given the same weight as some other types of legislative 
history, such as committee reports, because they generally represent only the view of 
the speaker and not necessarily that of the entire body. However, floor statements by 
the sponsors of the legislation are given considerably more weight than floor 
statements by other members, and they are given even more weight where, as here, 
other legislators did not offer any contrary views. 
Id. (citation omitted)). 
 298. Zuber, 396 U.S. at 210 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 299. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952). 
 300. Id. at 263. 
 301. See Manning, supra note 11, at 2464 (discussing Morissette and observing that, “[f]or 
statutes, the lawyer’s lexicon, of course, has particular relevance”). 
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If the statute at issue had been the Judiciary Act of 1789,302 Justice 
Jackson’s approach might have made sense. But in Morissette, the 
statute at issue was one governing general conduct, more specifically a 
criminal statute prohibiting the “embezzle[ment], steal[ing], 
purloin[ing], or knowing[] conver[sion]” of government property.303 
The question before the Court was whether that statute prohibited 
“embezzle[ment],” “steal[ing],” or “purloin[ing]” only if accompanied 
by criminal intent. The government argued that liability was not so 
restricted, contending that the express prohibition of “knowing[]” 
conversion implied the absence of an intent requirement for the other 
offenses.304 Unconvinced, the Court reasoned that, at common law, 
intent was “inherent in the idea” of larceny and other such crimes 
whereas certain “unwitting acts” constituted conversion.305 Thus, on 
the assumption that Congress intended to retain common-law usages, 
an express intent requirement would have been superfluous for the 
nonconversion offenses. 
 
 302. Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73 (1790). 
 303. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 248 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1948)). 
 304. See id. at 249–50. 
 305. Id. at 252–53. 
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Although the decision in Morissette was plausibly correct on rule-
of-lenity306 grounds,307 Justice Jackson’s general principle that statutes 
should be read through the eyes of a lawyer seems questionable. The 
principle is particularly dubious as applied to statutes speaking to an 
audience that includes ordinary citizens, who are presumably—and 
reasonably—not well versed in Blackstone.308 
To be clear, one could have reason to pay special attention to 
committee reports and the like if Congress formed collective 
intentions. When an author’s intentions are unclear after taking into 
account all mutually salient information, clarity will sometimes result 
from considering additional information salient to the author 
specifically. Suppose, for example, that a diplomat were to write an 
unclear note to her aide reading “Bring me the package” just days 
before being taken hostage. Here, the aide might try to resolve the 
unclarity by asking, “What package?” and considering sources of 
information that she ordinarily would not, such as the diplomat’s 
private email. Because considering such sources is nonstandard—
meaning that the information contained therein was not mutually 
salient at the time the note was written—it would have been 
 
 306. In general, whether “substantive” canons of interpretation (for example, the canon of 
constitutional avoidance and the federalism canon) are compatible with the conversation model 
is an open question. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW 
TO READ STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION 307–56 (2016) (discussing these and other 
substantive canons). To the extent that such canons are best understood as approximations of 
Congress’s intent, they likely reflect the sort of undue attention to the epistemic position of 
members of Congress criticized above (for example, a special concern with maintaining the “usual 
constitutional balance of federal and state powers,” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991), 
is probably not shared by most citizens). On the other hand, if such canons are best understood 
as something like judge-made law, see generally Baude & Sachs, supra note 73, then those canons 
may be on par with other prior judicial decisions in terms of mutual salience. See infra note 317. 
The latter possibility assumes, of course, that judges have the authority to make interpretive law. 
Regardless, the rule of lenity demands less justification than other substantive canons because it 
acts like a doctrinal mechanism for enforcing the mutual-salience requirement imposed by the 
conversation model—or at least a greatly relaxed analogue. By prohibiting the enforcement of an 
uncertain interpretation against a criminal defendant, the rule of lenity in effect bars courts from 
giving legal effect to a reading of a criminal statute that is, from the epistemic perspective of the 
defendant, unduly esoteric. See, e.g., United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 515 (2008) (“When 
interpreting a criminal statute, we do not play the part of a mindreader.”). But see United States 
v. Muscarello, 524 U.S. 125, 138 (1998) (“The rule of lenity applies only if, after seizing everything 
from which aid can be derived, . . . we can make no more than a guess as to what Congress 
intended.” (quoting United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 499 (1997) (alteration in original))). 
 307. See, e.g., Steal, WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1916) (defining “steal” as 
“to take without right and with intent to keep wrongfully” (emphasis added)). 
 308. Important here is that the statute at issue in Morissette was enacted in 1948. Act of June 
25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-772, 62 Stat. 725. 
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unreasonable for the diplomat to expect her aide to do so. Still, to the 
extent that the diplomat did not intend his message to be unclear, the 
aide might gain insight by considering those sources all the same. The 
same would be true with respect to unclear statutes if Congress formed 
collective intentions—but it does not. As such, there are no 
unexpressed intentions to discover in Congress’s personal effects. 
The question remains about what sources a court should consider 
in a particular case. To the extent that legislation is understood as a 
means of communication between the legislator and the legislated 
upon, norms of statutory interpretation should promote two basic 
values.309 The first is democracy: norms should make it feasible for a 
legislator to comprehend a bill at the time she casts her vote. The 
second is fair notice: norms should make it feasible for an individual on 
whom a statute operates to comprehend that statute once it is in effect.  
So understood, democracy and fair notice work in tandem to 
facilitate communication between legislator and citizen. Democracy 
ensures that a legislator understands what she is saying. Fair notice 
ensures that a citizen understands what was said. Put another way, a 
commitment to the above values flows just from a commitment to 
legislation as an effective means of communication.310 As Waldron 
explains, when attempting to communicate by statute, a legislator must 
assume that her words mean the same thing to her as they do to 
ordinary citizens.311 Together, democracy and fair notice help make it 
possible for that assumption to be a reasonable one. 
Prior scholarship assumes both of these values, though often 
without explicit discussion. Textualists stress, on the one hand, the 
preservation of legislative “bargains,”312 and, on the other, the public 
 
 309. See Nelson, supra note 14, at 353 (“Textualists and intentionalists alike give every 
indication of caring both about the meaning intended by the enacting legislature and about the 
need for readers to have fair notice of that meaning . . . .”); see also John F. Manning, Inside 
Congress’s Mind, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1947 (2015) (arguing that the “construct” of 
legislative intent “necessarily depend[s] on normative” premises). 
 310. More specifically, it flows from a commitment to legislation as an effective means of 
communication between legislator and citizen, as opposed to other legislators or legal elites. Much 
is required by basic notions of fairness and the rule of law. See supra notes 200–06 and 
accompanying text. 
 311. WALDRON, supra note 233, at 129. 
 312. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 11, at 541 (“[With] interest group legislation it is most 
likely that the extent of the bargain . . . is exhausted by the subjects of the express 
compromises . . . in the statute. The legislature ordinarily would rebuff any suggestion that judges 
be authorized to fill in blanks in the ‘spirit’ of the compromise.”); Manning, supra note 10, at 441 
(“[Textualists] believe that smoothing over the rough edges in a statute threatens to upset 
whatever complicated bargaining led to its being cast in the terms that it was.”). 
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accessibility of the law.313 What this shows is a commitment by 
textualists to both legislator (when she casts her vote) and citizen 
(postenactment) being able to know “what the law is”314 when it 
matters. And this, in turn, shows a commitment to effective 
communication between legislator and citizen. Purposivists—perhaps 
unsurprisingly, given their friendliness to legislative history—place 
more emphasis on legislator understanding.315 Still, even purposivists 
accept that courts should consider only publicly available materials 
when making sense of a statute.316 This concession shows that, in 
addition to legislator understanding, purposivists are at least to some 
extent also committed to citizen understanding. 
With respect to informational sources, both democracy and fair-
notice support, all other things being equal, norms that minimize the 
epistemic burden for involved parties. By minimizing the epistemic 
burden, such norms increase the feasibility of comprehension at all 
stages—enactment, compliance, enforcement, and adjudication—for 
all interpreters, including members of Congress, citizens, agencies, and 
courts.  
To illustrate, take a highly restrictive source norm prohibiting the 
consideration of nontextual, historical sources when interpreting a 
statute. Pursuant to this norm, one would interpret a legislative text 
with an eye to obvious conventions—like that Congress writes statutes 
in English—and to other formally binding instruments—like statutes, 
regulations, and judicial decisions.317 In turn, one would attribute to 
Congress whatever intentions one would attribute to a generic author 
on the basis of her having written that text, given this limited additional 
contextual information. With this norm in place, the epistemic burden 
 
 313. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 
1179 (1989) (“Rudimentary justice requires that those subject to the law must have the means of 
knowing what it prescribes.”). 
 314. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 315. See Nelson, supra note 14, at 351–52 (observing that purposivists “emphasiz[e] that 
statutes are mechanisms to convey the policy decisions of the people whom we have elected to 
legislate for us,” and that courts should “try to enforce the directives that members of the enacting 
legislature understood themselves to be adopting”); see also, e.g., McNollgast, supra note 91, at 
716 (emphasizing that “legislators do not want judicial interpretation of statutes to introduce 
randomness and unpredictability into policy outcomes”). 
 316. See Nelson, supra note 14, at 359 (observing that purposivists are “happy to treat 
committee reports and other publicly available materials as part of the context” but “reject other 
information that is probative of lawmakers’ actual intentions but not spread out on the public 
record”). 
 317. The reason for including other formally binding instruments is that their bindingness 
presumably generates a notice duty in the same way as the statutory text itself does. 
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on an interpreter would be minimal at each stage. The nonobvious 
information one would have to consider—such as the text of other 
formally binding instruments—would be of reasonably limited 
quantity, easy to access, and clearly designated. 
What speaks against such a norm? As applied to existing 
legislation, one concern is that such a norm might conflict with 
legislator understanding at the time of enactment. Suppose that some 
legislator were to base her understanding of some statute—either 
directly or indirectly—on the assumption that the statute would be 
read with an eye to various nontextual, historical sources. Here, the 
application of a highly restrictive source norm might render that 
legislator’s understanding incorrect, and consequently might hinder 
democracy if that legislator’s understanding is representative. This sort 
of mismatch is, as Professor Jarrod Shobe has argued, more common 
with older statutes.318 As Shobe explains, “Congress’s drafting process 
has become increasingly sophisticated over the last forty years,” with 
various reforms “allow[ing] professional drafters to be involved in 
virtually every legislative project.”319 The result is increased attention 
to textual “clarity,”320 which is just to say decreased reliance on 
nontextual, historical sources. But even with contemporary statutes, 
mismatch is possible. Increased “unorthodox lawmaking,”321 
lawmaking outside of the traditional committee structure, undermines 
efforts at clarity.322 Further, the use of “professional drafters,” like 
legislative counsel, remains optional.323 
The above suggests that application of a highly restrictive source 
norm to existing legislation would result in a sort of “democracy gap,” 
however minimal. For that reason, a less restrictive norm is plausibly 
appropriate with respect to such legislation, setting aside 
administrability concerns.324 Application of a less restrictive norm 
would increase the epistemic burden on all participants, citizens in 
 
 318. See Shobe, supra note 187, at 856–60. 
 319. Id. at 812, 815. 
 320. Id. at 831. But see Doerfler, supra note 23, at 815 (arguing that the size and complexity 
of contemporary statutes hinder efforts at textual precision); Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, supra note 
195, at 97–103 (similar). 
 321. See generally BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE 
PROCESSES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS (4th ed. 1997) (using “unorthodox lawmaking” to “distinguish 
frequently employed contemporary procedures and practices from what is still often presented in 
textbooks as the standard [legislative] process”). 
 322. See Shobe, supra note 187, at 859. 
 323. Id. at 821–22. 
 324. See infra notes 329–32 and accompanying text. 
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particular. For that reason, application of such a norm would seem to 
impair fair notice to some degree.325 Be that as it may, some tradeoff 
between fair notice and democracy is arguably unavoidable under 
current conditions.326 On the other hand, as applied to future 
legislation, a highly restrictive source norm would seem 
straightforwardly appropriate if accompanied by reforms to the 
legislative process. If Congress were to mandate participation of 
legislative counsel at each stage of the drafting process, any democracy 
gap would close, at least in large part. 
An additional concern with a highly restrictive source norm is that 
popular characterizations of formally binding instruments are plausibly 
more salient to citizens than the instruments themselves. This is 
especially so with contemporary statutes, which are exceedingly long 
and complex as well as exceptionally difficult to read.327 Under current 
conditions, an instruction to citizens to consult only the text of formally 
binding instruments would likely be ignored. Indeed, rather than 
attending only to the text, citizens would, under such conditions, 
plausibly attend only to popular characterizations of the text, no matter 
the instruction. What this suggests is that asking interpreters to just 
consult the text would, under current conditions, also result in a “fair-
notice gap.” Put differently, so long as formally binding instruments 
remain practically unreadable for ordinary readers, having courts 
consider popular characterizations of those instruments would 
plausibly increase citizen understanding of the law—again, setting 
aside administrability concerns. At the same time, it is conceivable that 
reforms to the legislative process could reduce any fair-notice gap that 
would result from a highly restrictive source norm, like stylistic reforms 
to improve readability.328 
A further concern is that the analysis above attends to fair notice 
and democracy to the exclusion of other values relevant to the question 
of which sources courts should consider, like judicial administrability. 
To clarify, the argument here is that insofar as legislation is best 
understood as a means of communication; fair notice and democracy 
are of central importance. To promote democracy and fair notice in 
 
 325. But see infra notes 327–28. 
 326. All the more so when a nontrivial number of legislators anticipate not only attention to 
nontextual sources but attention to nontextual sources highly salient to legislators in particular. 
 327. See Doerfler, supra note 23, at 815. 
 328. To be sure, any efforts in this direction would be constrained greatly by the size and 
complexity of the modern administrative state. Thanks to Abbe Gluck for emphasizing this 
concern more generally. 
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this context is, in effect, to reduce the burden on speaker and listener, 
respectively, and thereby to facilitate efficient communication between 
them. As noted above, that legislation is a means of communication is 
a near-universally shared premise by both courts and scholars.329 
Further, most of the discussion of which sources courts should consider 
is organized around the question of which sources are reliable evidence 
of what Congress meant by what it said.330 For these reasons, it makes 
good sense to focus here on the values the promotion of which facilitate 
easy and effective communication between Congress, citizens, courts, 
and agencies.  
Because interpretive norms must be implemented by nonideal 
judges, it is conceivable that attending to administrability or efficiency 
concerns would reshape the calculus somewhat (for example, following 
either might push one toward a highly restrictive source norm, 
democracy and fair-notice gaps notwithstanding).331 What is hard to 
see, however, is how attending to additional values would lead one to 
advocate judicial consideration of sources that violate a mutual-
salience constraint—at least as long as the aim of judicial interpretation 
is the faithful implementation of Congress’s instructions.332 
CONCLUSION 
Legislative intent is a necessary fiction. One can make sense of 
federal statutes only if one attributes to Congress various intentions, 
both communicative and practical. As an empirical matter, however, 
Congress qua “it” intends very little. The solution this Article proposes 
is to understand intent attributions not as aiming at the literal truth but 
rather as involving a pretense. The pretense this Article offers is that 
federal statutes have some author. Taken to involve this pretense, an 
attribution of intent is apt if and only if one would make the claim 
about a generic author just on the basis of her having written the statute 
as enacted. 
 
 329. See supra note 70. 
 330. See supra notes 281–308 and accompanying text. 
 331. See generally ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN 
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2006) (arguing for a highly restrictive 
source norm on administrability and efficiency grounds). 
 332. But see, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 5 
(1996) (describing the “pragmatist” judge who regards various legal sources “only as a means for 
bringing about the best results in the present case”). 
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Because legislative intent is a fiction, Congress has no actual but 
unexpressed intentions to discover. Often this will mean that federal 
statutes are less clear than one might have hoped. If Congress had 
“hidden” intentions, statutes that appear uncertain might become 
certain upon further investigation. And if statutes were uncertain less 
often, interpreting courts and agencies would have fewer policy 
decisions to make when resolving concrete disputes. The draw of 
positive-political-science accounts of legislative intent comes in no 
small part from the promise that, with enough data and methodological 
savvy, one could, when confronted with hard policy questions, identify 
answers laid down by Congress in advance. What this Article suggests, 
however, is that this promise is false. Quite often, text gives out, leaving 
a policy decision. Attention to the nuances of the legislative process 
does nothing to change this. 
 
